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ABSTRACT
This project bridges insights from theories of collective action, power, and
influence to address the conditions under which group leaders solve collective action
problems. Specifically, I show how group leaders’ behaviors impact the success of
collective action groups as a whole via both power and influence processes. The results
of a laboratory experiment support the prediction that other-regarding (prosocial) leaders
increase their contributions to the group after ascending to leadership, while selfregarding (proself) leaders reduce their contributions. Further, I show that rank and file
group members are influenced by their leaders’ contribution behaviors; as a result,
prosocial-led groups as a whole are substantially more productive than proself-led
groups. Indeed, as predicted, prosocial leaders were even more effective in maintaining
large group contributions than the standard peer sanctioning system, where the ability to
punish others is distributed equally among all group members. Importantly, these results
suggest that prosocial leaders—but not proself leaders—are an effective solution to
collective action problems. Therefore, I also address whether group members tend to
select prosocials for leadership positions (Study 2a), and whether they are able to identify
prosocials when all group members are able to compete for the leadership position by
vying to be elected to the role (Study 2b). Results from these studies suggest that people
prefer prosocials for the leader position, and that while group members do compete for
leadership, both prosocial and proself individuals compete at similar rates, such that
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prosocials remain higher contributors than their proself counterparts. As a result,
prosocials are particularly likely to be selected for leadership positions when group
contributions are known. Study 2b also demonstrates that groups that hold democratic
elections for leadership may induce more cooperative behavior in their members not only
once the leader is installed, but even before leadership hierarchies emerge as a result of
competition to be elected. Taken as a whole, the findings suggest that putting power and
influence in the right hands solves collective action problems and promotes collective
welfare. Leadership—specifically, democratically elected, prosocial leadership—
promises an effective solution to collective action problems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
How people resolve their individual interests with those of the groups they belong
to is a critical question in the social sciences (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005; Hardin 1982;
Horne 2009; Olson 1965). In a collective action problem, what is best for the individual
is in conflict with what is best for the group, yet if all pursue their own self-interest, the
group as a whole is worse off (Heckathorn 1996; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Willer 2009).
As Kollock (1998) notes, collective action problems are a ubiquitous part of social life,
ranging from everyday problems such as productivity in work groups to global efforts to
combat climate change. Since Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980), social scientists have
studied contributions to non-excludable public goods as the quintessential collective
action problem, given that self-interested individuals would prefer to free-ride on public
goods produced by others rather than bearing the costs of contributing themselves (Olson
1965).
Perhaps the most widely considered solution to enhance contributions to public
goods has been the introduction of sanctions. Allowing for the punishment or reward of
group members reduces the tension between individual and group goals by making freeriding, or not contributing, less attractive (Fehr and Gintis 2007; Heckathorn 1989; Macy
1993; Yamagishi 1992). Much past work has shown that people are willing to expend
valuable resources to punish free riders, and this effectively increases contributions to
public goods (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Henrich et al. 2006; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner
1

1992; Yamagishi 1986). Real-world groups often use sanctions to enhance contributions
to public goods (Horne 2009; Strimling and Eriksson 2014).
The prevailing model of sanctions in the experimental literature on collective
action is diffuse or “peer-to-peer” sanctions, where each group member can expend his or
her own resources to deduct earnings from each other group member (Nosenzo and
Sefton 2014; Shinada and Yamagishi 2007). While diffuse punishment systems increase
contributions to collective efforts, researchers have pointed to several critical
disadvantages of using them, as described in the next chapter. Just as importantly,
modelling sanctions in the lab as peer-to-peer treats groups facing public good dilemmas
as non-hierarchical—that is, it ignores the role that social differentiation processes play
in administering punishment and solving collective action problems in real-world groups
(Grossman and Baldassarri 2012).
Perhaps for these reasons, several researchers have begun to address how
designating a single group leader to administer costly sanctions can impact contributions
to collective action groups (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri
2012; Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015; Van Vugt and De Cremer 1999). However, in each of
these studies, the leader was either completely external to the group or, once the leader
had been selected from among the group members, they no longer made contributions
and thus had no vested interest in the collective good. Therefore, no prior studies have
addressed whether and how group leaders’ own contribution behaviors change after
receiving the leader position. Nor have they shown whether and how leaders’
contributions influence the contributions of rank and file members and group-level
outcomes more generally. Finally, no studies have addressed how groups in which the
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capacity to sanction is given to a single group member fare relative to the standard
solution in the literature, where sanctioning capacity is equally distributed among all
group members.
Here I integrate insights from the literatures on collective action, power, and
influence to address how and when leadership can help solve collective action problems.
In the next chapters, after describing my conceptualization of leadership, I argue that
prosocial, or other-regarding, group leaders will lead for the benefit of their groups,
whereas proself (self-regarding)-led groups, on the whole, will be worse off. Perhaps
more importantly, I address why prosocial leaders are so effective. I develop a theory in
Chapter 3 that demonstrates how, via the exercise of power and influence, prosocial (but
not proself) leaders establish norms of high cooperation among members of the rank and
file. In addition, I argue that the benefits of prosocial leadership will exceed those
provided by the standard solution to collective action problems, where the ability to
punish is distributed equally among group members.
I test my hypotheses in a laboratory study. In Study 1, participants face a standard
public good dilemma without sanctions. Then, in the punishment phase of the study, I
manipulate whether one person (the leader conditions) or all group members (the peer
punishment condition) may punish each other group member. I compare two different
leader conditions: one where a prosocial has the sole ability to punish, and one where a
proself is given punishment ability. Results suggest that prosocial leaders increase their
contributions to the group—above and beyond their baseline tendencies to contribute—
after ascending to leadership. Proself leaders, on the other hand, significantly decrease
their contributions after receiving the leader position. For both types of leaders, via an
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influence process, leaders’ contribution decisions predict rank and file group members’
future contribution decisions. The result is that prosocial-led groups on the whole
produce larger public goods than either proself-led groups or groups where all members
have the ability to punish. A different pattern emerges for earnings from the public good,
however. Although proself leaders and their rank and file counterparts contribute less to
public goods than peer-punishment groups, both prosocial- and proself-led groups earn
more from the public good than their peer-punishment counterparts, due to the lower use
of wealth-destroying punishments in leader groups. The experimental design, procedures,
and results of Study 1 are detailed in Chapter 4.
The substantial improvement in welfare of groups with prosocial leaders in
particular, relative to those with peer-to-peer sanctioning systems, may explain the
tendency for real-world groups to limit sanctioning capacity to designated leaders or
monitors (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Eriksson and Strimling 2012; Ostrom 2000).
However, the results of Study 1 suggest that the benefits of leadership can only accrue to
groups if prosocial individuals ascend to leadership positions, by whatever mechanism.
Thus, one important question that is not addressed in Study 1 is whether prosocials
actually do tend to end up as leaders of collective action groups. Do groups tend to select
their more prosocial members to lead them? I also argue that the election of leaders,
rather than leader appointment, will enhance public good production above and beyond
the ability of elected-leader groups to choose more effective leaders. I discuss these
issues and the motivation for Studies 2a and 2b in Chapter 5.
In a vignette study (Study 2a) I demonstrate that prosocials are preferred for
positions of leadership, and if given the opportunity to select the leader, group members
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facing collective action problems would prefer to elect a prosocial. In an experiment
(Study 2b) I show that allowing group members to select their leaders via an election
(compared to, in Study 1, appointment to leadership) enhances public good production in
two ways. First, supporting some past work, groups (both leaders and rank and file group
members) contribute more when the leader was elected rather than appointed. Second,
election to leadership promotes public good production because group members compete
for the leadership position, by contributing more before the election than they do before a
leader will be appointed. Importantly, although allowing groups to elect their leaders
induces competition for leadership, because both prosocials and proselfs cooperate more
when competition for leadership is possible, groups are still able to identify prosocials
and select them for leadership positions. The experimental design, procedures, and results
of Studies 2a and 2b are detailed in Chapter 6.
Taken as a whole, the studies presented here suggest that putting power in the
right hands leads to substantially greater collective welfare than does the current
prevailing solution to collective action problems. In the final chapter I summarize the
findings, and discuss the implications of the results. Finally, I suggest new directions for
future research on leadership and collective action.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In order to provide their members with benefits, groups must overcome collective
action problems (Olson 1965). In a collective action problem, individual rationality is in
conflict with collective rationality, such that people may engage in self-interested actions
that do not further the benefits of the group (Heckathorn 1996; Marwell and Oliver 1993;
Willer 2009). How people resolve their individual interests with those of the groups they
belong to is a critical question in the social sciences (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005;
Hardin 1982; Horne 2009; Olson 1965). This is particularly true given the ubiquity of
collective action problems: from everyday interpersonal exchanges like productivity in
work groups to the mobilization of large-scale social movements or efforts to combat
climate change, situations often occur where what is best for the individual is at odds
with what is best for the group.
Since Marwell and Ames (1979, 1980), social scientists have studied
contributions to non-excludable public goods as the quintessential collective action
problem, given that self-interested individuals would prefer to free-ride on the public
goods produced by others than to bear the costs of contributing themselves (Olson 1965).
In a public good dilemma, individual group members must decide whether or not to
contribute their private resources to produce a public good that benefits everyone,
regardless of how much each individual contributed—that is, public goods are nonexcludable. For example, everyone can enjoy public radio, blood supplies, or clean air
6

regardless of whether, or how much, they have contributed to the provision of the good.
Given that public goods are non-excludable, it is best for any one individual to “free ride”
off of the contributions of others, by enjoying the benefits of the public good without
contributing to its contribution or maintenance (Kollock 1998). But if everyone in the
group does so, then all will be worse off, as the public good will not be provided. Many
important problems facing groups and societies involve the production of public goods:
as briefly noted above, the maintenance of public radio and television, efforts to maintain
clean air and water supplies, blood donation, and a variety of other critical issues involve
the production of a public good.
Given that public goods problems—and collective action problems more
generally—are pervasive in daily life, much past work has considered how they can be
solved. Contrary to a pure rational self-interest perspective, people do make cooperative
choices in collective action situations (Kollock 1998). How do groups motivate their
members to forgo self-interest and contribute to group efforts? Past work has proposed a
variety of explanations for how to increase cooperative behavior in collective action
situations (for reviews, see Kollock 1998; Messick and Brewer 1983). For example,
allowing group members to communicate with each other (Balliet 2010; Dawes,
McTavish, and Shaklee 1977; Ostrom et al. 1992; van de Kragt, Orbell; and Dawes 1983)
and make pledges to cooperate (Chen and Komorita 1994; Kerr et al. 1997; Orbell, van
de Kragt, and Dawes 1988) have been shown to increase cooperation. In addition,
enhanced feelings of social identification with the group can play an important role in
determining whether people will engage in more group-serving behaviors (De Cremer
and Van Vugt 1999; Kramer and Brewer 1984; Van Vugt and Hart 2004).

7

But perhaps the most widely considered solution to collective action problems has
been the introduction of sanctions, such that group members have the ability to punish
free-riders, reward cooperators, or both (Yamagishi 1986, 1988a; Kollock 1998;
Komorita 1987). Olson (1965) considered “selective incentives”, or private rewards and
punishments to encourage contributions to collective efforts, as a necessity for groups to
solve collective action problems. Since Olson, a host of past research has considered
whether rewards or punishments can successfully induce individuals to put aside their
self-interest and cooperate to solve large-scale collective action problems. Allowing for
the punishment or reward of group members reduces the tension between individual and
group goals by making free-riding, or not contributing, less attractive (Fehr and Gintis
2007; Heckathorn 1989; Macy 1993; Yamagishi 1992).
Of course, sanctions will only impact cooperation if they will actually be
administered—or at least, if there exists a credible threat that they will be administered
(Fehr and Gachter 2000; 2002; Fehr et al. 2002). Importantly, much past work has shown
that people are indeed willing to expend valuable resources to punish free riders, and this
effectively increases contributions to public goods (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Fehr and
Fischbacher 2004; Henrich et al. 2006; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1992; Yamagishi
1986, 1988).
In particular, sanctions enhance cooperation via two separate mechanisms (Fehr
and Fischbacher 2004a; 2004b; Shinada and Yamagishi 2007). First, because a majority
of people are willing to punish free-riders, there is a credible threat that reduces the
attractiveness of free riding. That is, the threat of punishment discourages would-be
defectors. Second, because would-be defectors can be punished, would-be cooperators
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are assured that others will cooperate as well. Thus punishment can also encourage
cooperation by reducing potential contributors’ fear that others will not cooperate (Fehr
and Fischbacher 2004a; 2004b; Shinada and Yamagishi 2007). Fehr and Gachter (2000;
2002) have conducted experiments showing that without sanctions, cooperation typically
declines over time. However, when group members are given the ability to pay to
sanction each other, cooperation dramatically increases. Importantly, this increase in
cooperative behavior is observed even on the very first round of interaction, which
suggests that just the threat of punishment itself is credible enough to enhance grouporiented behavior (Fehr and Gachter 2000; 2002).
The prevailing model of sanctions in the experimental literature on collective
action—including in the work reviewed above—is peer sanctioning, where each group
member can punish every other group member (Nosenzo and Sefton 2014; Shinada and
Yamagishi 2007). As noted above, peer punishment systems do successfully increase
contributions to collective efforts. However, they also have a number of critical
drawbacks. First, there are often significant costs associated with contributing to the
provision or maintenance of a sanctioning system (Kollock 1998; Yamagishi 1986).
Indeed, sanctions themselves are a public good (Heckathorn 1989; Oliver 1980) and, as a
result, pose a “second-order free rider problem,” such that group members may be
motivated to enjoy the fruits of sanctions (the resultant increase in group contributions)
without bearing the costs of providing them (Heckathorn 1989; Oliver 1980). The
difficulty of coordinating peer punishment can also result in over-punishment when
group members “pile on” a free-rider, meting out a punishment that outweighs the
offense (Nosenzo and Sefton 2014). Relatedly, the costs of sanctions sometimes exceed
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the benefits of increased cooperation, thus reducing overall welfare (Dreber et al. 2008;
Ostrom et al. 1992; Nikiforakis 2008). Finally, the potential for retaliatory acts of
counter-punishment can increase negative emotions and decrease contributions to the
public good (Nikiforakis 2008).
Compared to peer sanctioning systems, institutions in which a single person is
responsible for punishment are less subject to coordination problems, over-punishment
and the associated earnings losses (Eriksson, Strimling, and Ehn 2013; Grossman and
Baldassarri 2012; O’Gorman, Henrich, and Van Vugt 2009). Just as importantly,
sanctioning capacity in many real-world groups is centralized in a single individual or
role-occupant, rather than distributed equally among all group members (Baldassarri and
Grossman 2011; Eriksson and Strimling 2012; Guala 2012; Ostrom 2000). Thus, not only
is there is a mismatch between the sanctioning institutions we tend to observe in the real
world, which generally limit who can sanction whom, and the standard solution—peer
sanctions—that is proffered by the literature; some evidence suggests that the solution
more commonly observed in real-world groups may be the more effective one.1
Perhaps for these reasons, several studies have shown that designating a group
leader—in these studies, a single individual able to monitor group members’ behavior

1

Of course, other types of sanctioning systems are also possible. For example, giving sole punishment

ability to a group leader is one form of centralized sanctioning, but pool punishment, where group members
invest in a formal institution that punishes according to predetermined rules, is another (e.g., Yamagishi
1986). Moreover, groups are often characterized by multiple forms or sources of sanctions. For instance, in
any given group, formal rewards and sanctions may be administered by a group leader, while informal
rewards and sanctions (e.g., peer pressure or disapproval) flow between rank and file members (Kitts 2006;
Shinada and Yamagishi 2007).
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and administer punishment—can promote contributions to collective action (Baldassarri
and Grossman 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012; Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015; Van
Vugt and De Cremer 1999). Yet as described in more detail below, in each of these
studies, the leader was either completely external to the group or, once the leader had
been selected from among the group members, they no longer made contributions and
thus had no vested interest in the collective good. Therefore, prior studies have not
addressed whether and how group leaders’ own contribution behaviors change after
receiving the leader position; nor have they shown whether and how leaders’
contributions influence the contributions of rank and file members. Finally, no studies
have addressed how groups in which the capacity to sanction is given to a single group
member fare relative to the standard solution in the literature, where sanctioning capacity
is equally distributed among all group members. This work aims to address these issues.2
In the sections to follow, I integrate insights from the literatures on collective
action, power, and influence to address how and when leadership can help solve
collective action problems. After describing my conceptualization of leadership, I argue
that prosocial, or other-regarding, group leaders will lead for the benefit of their groups,
whereas proself (self-regarding)-led groups, on the whole, will be worse off. Perhaps
more importantly, I address why prosocial leaders are so effective, showing how, via the
exercise of power and influence, prosocials—but not proselfs—establish norms of high
cooperation among members of the rank and file. In addition, I argue that the benefits of
2

That is, the goal of the work presented here was to conduct a first investigation of the dynamics and

effectiveness of “pure” leadership systems versus “pure” peer sanctioning systems. I therefore do not
empirically address how the two systems interact. This is a critical question for future work, as discussed in
the final chapter.

11

prosocial leadership exceed those provided by the standard solution to collective action
problems, where the ability to punish is distributed equally among group members.

Group Leadership
There are many different forms—and definitions—of leadership (Bass and Bass
2009). But the literature generally defines leaders as those who use various tools—most
commonly, power and influence —to induce rank and file members to produce desired
outcomes (Ahlquist and Levi 2011, Bass and Bass 2009). Effective use of these tools can
facilitate group interaction and group goals, producing benefits to both leaders and their
followers (Anderson and Brown 2010; Ahlquist and Levi 2011; Van Vugt, Hogan, and
Kaiser 2008). Groups facing intergroup and intragroup conflict support appointing a
leader, particularly when the group is performing poorly (Benard 2012; see also
Samuelson et al. 1984; Van Vugt and De Cremer 1999). Yet whether leadership will
ultimately help or harm group outcomes depends strongly on leader characteristics,
including leadership style (Van Vugt and De Cremer 1999; 2002), and, most relevant
here, how the leader is affected by the power inherent in the leadership role (Anderson
and Brown 2010).
Key to my conception of leadership is that leaders possess disproportionate power
over rank and file members (Anderson and Brown 2010; Bass and Bass 2009; French and
Raven 1959). Since Weber (1947), sociologists and social psychologists have conceived
of power as the ability of an individual to impose their will on others via their control
over valuable resources (Cook and Emerson 1978; Emerson 1962; French and Raven
1959; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1987; Sell et al. 2004). Following Weber,
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sociological work has focused on power as the capacity to reward (Molm 1988, 1989,
1990) and punish (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Lawler and Bacharach 1987; Molm
1988, 1989, 1990; Ostrom et al. 1992; Sell and Wilson 1999; Yamagishi 1986).
Following the literature on which this work builds (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011;
Grossman and Baldassarri 2012; Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015; Van Vugt and De Cremer
1999), here I focus specifically on leaders whose power is based on their sole ability to
punish other group members. This focus on leaders who can punish—versus reward—
facilitates comparisons with peer sanctioning systems which, with very few exceptions,
typically focus on punishment (see Shinada and Yamagishi 2007 for a review).
Because leadership typically entails disproportionate power over others
(Anderson and Brown 2010; Bass and Bass 2009), it is important to know whether and
how those who move into leadership positions are affected by power. Indeed, how
leaders wield their power has important consequences in a variety of micro and macro
organizational settings (Anderson and Brown 2010; Flynn, Gruenfeld, Molm, and Polzer
2011). One line of research holds that power corrupts (Bass and Bass 2009; Kipnis 1972,
1976). For instance, compared to their less powerful counterparts, the powerful tend to be
more attentive to rewards, and construe others as a means to attain rewards (Keltner,
Gruenfeld, and Anderson 2003). Similarly, power reduces individuals’ ability to
accurately perceive others and the relations between them (Keltner and Robinson 1996,
1997; Simpson, Markovsky and Steketee 2011). The powerful are more likely to rely on
stereotypes when judging interaction partners (Fiske 1993). The powerful spend more
money on themselves compared to others, a pattern that is reversed for the powerless
(Rucker, DuBois, and Galinsky 2011). In addition, individuals with high power are less
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likely to adopt others’ perspectives (Galinsky et al. 2006) and more likely to treat others
hostilely (Keltner et al. 2001).
This past work, then, suggests that power enhances self-regarding tendencies—
and reduces other-regarding tendencies. From this perspective, it might seem puzzling
that leadership is so ubiquitous in real-world collective action groups—and that past work
has considered whether solitary punishers in the lab will promote cooperation. Rather, the
“power corrupts” approach seems to suggest that, given enhanced power over others,
leaders will respond by engaging in self-serving behaviors.
Indeed, as noted above, no past research on whether a single group leader can
sustain contributions to collective action problems has considered how receiving the
leader position impacts the leader’s own cooperative behavior. Rather, existing work on
the group leader solution to collective action problems has typically designated a leader
who is external to the group, and thus uninvolved in the provision of—and unable to
benefit from—the public good (e.g. Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Grossman and
Baldassarri 2012; Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015).3 The one exception (O’Gorman et al. 2009)
gave a solitary punisher the ability to administer sanctions only after group members
made their contributions to the public good. Thus, each group member did not know

3

To be clear, Grossman and Baldassarri (2012; Baldassarri and Grossman 2011) refer to leaders in their

study as internal to the group, meaning the leader was selected from among group members. But, once the
leader was given punishment power, she no longer made contributions and had no vested interest in the
collective good.
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when deciding how much to contribute if she would be able to punish others, or if she
would instead face punishment from another.4
The omission of work on internal, contributing group leaders with the sole power
to punish others may be partly due to the prominence of the “power corrupts” perspective
described above. That is, this work suggests—and researchers might have assumed—that
leaders given sole ability to punish their group members would take advantage of their
position, free-riding on the efforts of the group while punishing others who choose to do
so. But given that, in real-world groups, leaders are typically internal (vs. external) group
members (Grossman and Baldassarri 2012), it is important to know whether and how
group members will alter their efforts to the group once they have received a position of
leadership within that group.
Although the work reviewed above suggests that power increases self-oriented
behaviors and tendencies, some additional research has taken a substantially more
nuanced view of how power impacts those who possess it (Blader and Chen 2012; Chen
et al. 2001; DeCelles et al. 2012). These person x situation approaches argue that power
accentuates baseline dispositions, such that those with other-regarding preferences will
become more other-regarding when they acquire power, while those with more selfregarding preferences will become more self-regarding than they were before they
obtained power (Chen et al. 2001). That is, power affords individuals with the freedom to
express their own traits and attitudes—whether for the good or for the bad (Anderson and
4

In addition, the solitary punisher in the O’Gorman et al. (2009) study had the punishing role for one round

only; in each subsequent round, a new leader was randomly chosen. Thus at no point did leaders know they
would be leaders until after they had made their contribution decision—preventing them from making
contribution choices strategically based on their role (punisher or non-punisher).
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Berdahl 2003; Keltner et al. 2003). More generally, this work suggests that individuallevel variables will moderate whether power possession leads to positive or negative
outcomes (Sturm and Antonakis 2014).
In the sections to follow, I apply this person x situation approach to the problem
of leadership in collective action groups. Specifically, I consider whether an individual’s
social value orientation will moderate how the acquisition of a leadership position—here,
having the sole ability to sanction group members—affects her behavior. Perhaps more
importantly, I later address how leaders’ response to the leadership position will
ultimately impact the behaviors of rank and file group members, and the success of
collective action groups as a whole, via both power and influence processes (Thye 2000;
Thye, Willer, and Markovsky 2006; Willer, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997).

Social Value Orientation
A number of studies in sociology, social psychology, and behavioral economics
have addressed the role of different social preferences in explaining variation in
cooperative behavior, including contributions to collective action (e.g. Fehr and Gintis
2007; Ones and Putterman 2007; Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 2007;
Yamagishi et al. 2013). One of the most powerful person-level predictors of behaviors in
collective action situations is an individual’s social value orientation, defined as a
relatively stable preference for how valuable outcomes are distributed between oneself
and others (Balliet et al. 2009; Kollock 1998).
Although many social value orientations are theoretically possible, researchers
generally focus on three “types”: individualists, competitors, and prosocials (Van Lange
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et al. 1997). Individualists seek to maximize their own outcomes with less regard for the
outcomes of others. Competitors seek to maximize the difference between their own and
others’ outcomes. Compared to these two “proself” value orientations, prosocials tend to
maximize joint outcomes and to minimize differences between own and others’ outcomes
(Van Lange et al. 1997).
Social value orientation is predictive of a wide range of other-regarding behaviors
in both the lab and in real-world settings. Compared to proselfs (both individualists and
competitors), prosocials donate more to charity (Van Lange et al. 2007), are more
concerned with group goals in organizational settings (Nauta et al. 2002), take more
cooperative approaches to negotiations with others (De Dreu and Boles 1998), and, most
relevant here, contribute more in collective action situations (Balliet et al. 2009). Here I
focus on how prosocials and proselfs will respond to leadership positions, and how their
behaviors as leaders impact contribution norms and the behaviors of rank and file group
members.

A Person x Situation Approach to Leadership and Collective Action
As described earlier, some past work suggests that the possession of power
enhances self-regarding (and reduces other-regarding) behavior. Alternatively, the person
x situation approach to power suggests that, rather, power enhances baseline tendencies
in the power holder (Chen et al. 2001). Following this line of work, in this section I
consider how prosocials and proselfs will respond to leadership positions, and how their
behaviors as leaders will impact contribution norms—i.e., the behaviors of their nonleader group members.
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Specifically, following past work that suggests power accentuates baseline
behaviors—and noting that prior work demonstrates prosocials contribute at higher rates
than proselfs in collective action situations—I expect that proselfs given a group leader
role will reduce their contributions to the public good, such that they will contribute less
when they ascend to a powerful leadership position. On the other hand, prosocial leaders
will contribute more when they become leaders. Consider a real-world example. This
argument would suggest that, in a work group, a relatively prosocial leader given the
ability to distribute tasks among his or her group members might choose to take on a
disproportionate share of the work herself. On the other hand, a relatively proself leader,
in the same situation, would be more apt to free-ride on the efforts of his or her
subordinates, delegating a substantial portion of the work to others. I outline this
theoretical argument in more detail in the next chapter.
Importantly, I expect that these effects will occur above and beyond baseline
differences in contributions between prosocials and proselfs. After all, prosocials are
generally more cooperative than proselfs under situations of equal power (see Balliet et
al. 2009 for a review). But following Chen et al. (2001), I expect that the acquisition of
power will magnify these baseline tendencies in the power holder. That is, proself
individuals will become even more self-regarding when they receive the powerful
leadership position while prosocials will become even more group-oriented.
If a leader contributes less to the group as a consequence of his or her power, it
necessarily follows that the group as a whole will be worse off, since less of the public
good will be provided when any one group member does not contribute his or her
resources. Similarly, if a leader contributes more to the group, then the group as a whole
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will benefit given that groups do better the more that any one individual contributes.
More important, however, is how leaders’ own behaviors shape group-level outcomes by
impacting others’ contribution behaviors. In the next section, I consider two routes
through which leaders might promote (or inhibit) the welfare of the groups they lead:
influence and power use.

Leader Impact on Group-Level Outcomes: Influence
Besides enhanced power, leaders normally enjoy greater influence in groups
(Anderson and Brown 2010; Lucas 2003). Whereas power entails the ability to impose
one’s will on others via control over resources, influence involves modifying others’
behavior without the use of sanctions, e.g., via persuasion, information, or advice (Willer
et al. 1997; Willer, Troyer, and Lovaglia 2005). A long tradition of research in sociology
connects standing in status hierarchies to disproportionate influence over other group
members (Berger et al. 1977; Ridgeway 2001); some of this work has focused
specifically on the influence enjoyed by group leaders (e.g. Lucas 2003).
Several studies have addressed the role of status-based influence in collective
action groups (Clark, Clark and Polborn 2006; Sell 1997; Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway
2012; Willer 2009). These studies find that higher status group members initiate
contributions to their groups and influence others to give at higher levels than they would
otherwise, thus establishing cooperative norms over time. But as noted above, no prior
work has considered whether group leaders—following past work, those with the sole
ability to punish their group members—influence others to give via their own increased
(or decreased) contributions to collective efforts.
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Leaders are afforded a special position in group decision-making hierarchies (Van
Vugt 2006); group leaders are more salient than non-leaders and command greater
attention (Clark, Clark, and Polborn 2006; Ahlquist and Levi 2011). Thus leaders’
behaviors, in particular, serve as a focal point that other group members consider when
making their own choices (Ahlquist and Levi 2011). Charities, for instance, rely on
“leadership giving,” or large contributions from an initial wealthy donor, to induce others
to give (Andreoni 2006). In the lab, studies of sequential public good games—where an
initial group leader contributes first—show that group outcomes are enhanced when a
leader’s contribution signals to others that they should also contribute (Potters et al. 2007;
Moxnes and Van der Heijden 2003). In line with this past work, I suggest that nonleaders will focus especially on leaders’ contributions when making their own
contribution decisions. That is, I expect that leaders’ contributions will play a larger role
in the emergence of cooperative group norms—or uncooperative group norms—via an
influence process.
Social norms play a central role in enhancing cooperation in groups facing
collective action problems (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004a; 2004b). Norms are rules
prescribing what people should or should not do in a given situation; when violated, they
are enforced by sanctions (Cialdini and Trost 1998; Hechter and Opp 2001; Horne 2009).
Like sanctions, norms have a dramatic impact on behavior (Hechter and Opp 2001;
Horne 2009). Norms discouraging free-riding behavior, in particular, are proposed to
contribute to the provision of public goods and allow groups to solve collective action
problems (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004a; 2004b; Gintis et al. 2003).
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One norm that has been widely considered as having an impact on cooperation to
collective action is the norm of conditional cooperation—that is, that one should
cooperate given that others cooperate (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004a; 2004b; Fischbacher
and Gachter 2010; Gintis et al. 2003). Players using the Tit-for-Tat strategy in repeated
social dilemmas, for instance, are behaving in a conditionally cooperative manner
(Axelrod 1984; Kollock 1998). Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a) show that a large
percentage of people behave like conditional cooperators: they cooperate if others
cooperate, increasing their own contributions if the average contribution of others is
increasing.
Thus, a norm of conditional cooperation—combined with people’s willingness to
enforce the norm by punishing norm violators—can enhance cooperation in groups
facing collective action problems. On the other hand, social norms will be detrimental to
cooperative behavior if self-interested behavior, rather than group-oriented behavior, is
the norm. If norms suggest self-interested behavior is appropriate, then other-oriented
behaviors will decrease and self-regarding behavior will increase (e.g., Irwin and
Simpson 2013). That is, normative content can moderate whether norms will help or hurt
groups solving collective action problems.
Linking leaders’ ability to shape group norms via their enhanced influence, to the
earlier discussion of how proselfs and prosocials respond to the acquisition of leadership,
implies that there will be divergent collective outcomes depending on leaders’ social
value orientation. Specifically, if leaders have disproportionate influence on the behaviors
of rank and file members, and prosocial leaders contribute more to the group upon
ascending to leadership, it follows that rank and file members led by a prosocial will also
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contribute more to group goals. That is, prosocial leaders can be expected to establish
cooperative norms among their group members, influencing non-leaders to contribute at
higher rates as well.
On the other hand, following this same logic, members of proself-led groups can
be expected to make less cooperative choices. If proself leaders decrease their
contributions upon receiving the leader position, they may establish norms of
uncooperative behavior such that rank and file group members also contribute less.
Consider the example given in the previous section, where prosocial and proself leaders
are expected to behave differently when delegating tasks among members of a work
group. When a prosocial leader of a work group takes on a disproportionate share of the
work towards a common goal, her subordinates may be influenced to match the leader’s
high effort level in subsequent cooperative tasks. On other hand, a more proself leader
may influence her subordinates to reduce their efforts to the group, given that the leader
has also put forth less effort. In this way, prosocials’ and proselfs’ responses to
leadership, and the subsequent influence that their contributions have on the behaviors of
rank and file members, will determine the extent to which groups with leaders will
ultimately succeed at collective action.

A Second Possible Route from Leaders’ Behaviors to Group Outcomes
Thus far I have argued that leadership can generate divergent effects, since
prosocials and proselfs will respond differently to the power that accrues to leaders (see
also Chen et al. 2001). Further, I expect that the effect of receiving this powerful leader
position on the leader will spark divergent collective outcomes via an influence effect.
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But it is also possible that these different group-level outcomes will emerge as a result of
the leaders’ differential exercise of his or her power (i.e., the use of punishment) on rank
and file group members.
Specifically, the behavioral economics literature on sanctioning defines strong
reciprocators or altruistic punishers as those who, compared to their more self-interested
counterparts, contribute at high levels and punish others who fail to do so (Fehr and
Gachter 2002; Fehr and Gintis 2007). This line of research suggests that prosocials will
punish low contributions at higher rates than will proselfs. Therefore, prosocial leaders
may not only be more likely to contribute at higher levels after obtaining a powerful
leadership position (here and in the next chapter I refer to the effect of power on the
powerholder as a first-order power effect); they may also be more likely to punish others
who fail to cooperate at high rates, thus increasing their group members’ cooperation
levels via their use of power (a second-order power effect—that is, the effect of power
exercise on the less powerful).
Note, however, that some research runs counter to this strong reciprocity
prediction. For instance, Ones and Putterman (2007) find evidence for individual
differences in both contribution behavior and punishment strategies, noting that
propensities to contribute and to punish are not perfectly correlated. More recent work
has found that tendencies to cooperate and tendencies to punish others who do not
cooperate are completely orthogonal, contrary to strong reciprocity approaches (Eriksson
et al. 2014). In any case, although I primarily expect leaders to impact rank and file
members’ contributions via an influence process, I will also assess these second-order
power effects as a non-competing mechanism.
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To review, as noted earlier, no prior work has examined whether giving a single
group member the sole ability to sanction his or her group members will promote
collective action when the leader is an internal, contributing group member. As a result,
we do not know from existing work whether leaders promote (or inhibit) collective action
in the groups they belong to via power or influence processes. Nor do we know whether
groups with leaders will fare better or worse than groups with a standard peer sanctioning
system in place, i.e., a sanctioning system where all group members have equal power to
punish others. Some past work suggests power enhances self-regarding (and reduces
other-regarding) behavior; the alternative person x situation approach suggests that,
rather, power enhances baseline tendencies (Chen et al. 2001).
Following this line of work, in the next chapter I outline the theoretical argument
that prosocials and proselfs will differentially respond to leadership positions. In addition,
I address how, upon ascending to leadership, leaders’ behaviors impact contribution
norms and the behaviors of rank and file group members via power and influence
processes. Finally, I consider how leadership will fare compared to the standard solution
in the literature on collective action, peer sanctions.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY
The theory and hypotheses I detail in this chapter build on prior work on
leadership, power, and collective action. As noted earlier, no prior work has examined
whether giving a group leader—following past work, a single group member given the
sole ability to sanction his or her group members—will promote collective action when
that group leader is also a contributing member of the group. As a result, we do not know
from existing work whether, and how, leaders will alter their contribution behavior after
receiving the leadership position. Nor do we know whether leaders will promote (or
inhibit) collective action in the groups they belong to via power or influence processes.
Finally, we do now know whether groups with leaders will fare better or worse than
groups with a standard peer sanctioning system in place. This work aims to address these
issues.
First I consider how leadership will impact the leaders’ own behavior before
turning to how leadership affects followers’ responses. Following my conception of
leadership as detailed in the previous chapter, leaders are those who typically have
enhanced power over their group, including the ability to administer rewards and
punishments toward their non-leader group members (Anderson and Brown 2010; Bass
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and Bass 2009).5 Indeed, past work on the leadership solution to collective action has
granted the leader the sole power to sanction his or her group members after observing
their contributions to group efforts. And since Weber (1947), sociologists and social
psychologists have conceived of power as the ability of an individual to impose their will
on others via their control over valuable resources, including rewards and punishments
(Cook and Emerson 1978; Emerson 1962; French and Raven 1959; Markovsky, Willer,
and Patton 1987; Sell et al. 2004). Once people receive a powerful leadership position,
then, how will they react?
Following the person x situation approach to power discussed in the previous
chapter—power accentuates baseline dispositions, enhancing individuals’ propensities to
express their own traits and attitudes (Blader and Chen 2012; Chen et al. 2001; DeCelles
et al. 2012), I assume that
Assumption 1: If an individual receives a position of leadership, they are more apt
to act according to their own preferences.
Further, as described in the previous chapter, much past work suggests that social
value orientation is one of the most powerful person-level predictors of cooperative
behavior, including contributions to collective action (e.g. Fehr and Gintis 2007; Ones
5

Of course, while leadership is correlated with power, it is not a sole determinant of power-holding.

Some leaders may have limited or no power, and non-leaders may have power over leaders, for
instance, when choosing to elect them to leadership or not. But because leaders typically hold power
and this power is considered to be critical to groups’ success or failure, here I focus on whether
leaders who do obtain power over their followers can successfully solve collective action problems.
That obtaining the leadership position gives the leader enhanced power over non-leaders, then, is a
key scope condition for the theory outlined in this chapter.
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and Putterman 2007; Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 2007; Yamagishi et al.
2013). Specifically, prosocials prefer to minimize differences in valuable outcomes
between themselves and others, while proselfs prefer to maximize their own outcomes.
Assumption 2a: If a prosocial individual is more apt to act according to their own
preferences, then they will contribute more to collective action.
Assumption 2b: If a proself individual is more apt to act according to their own
preferences, then they will contribute less to collective action.
From these assumptions I derive Hypothesis 1 below, which argues that the social
value orientation of the group leader will moderate leader behavior. But perhaps more
importantly, I expect granting leadership to a single group member will not only affect
the leader him or herself (as in Assumption 1) – I also expect that granting leadership to a
single group member affects non-leader group members, via an influence process. As
reviewed in the previous chapter, leaders are afforded a special position in group
decision-making hierarchies. They are more salient than their non-leader group members
and command greater attention among followers making their own choices (Clark, Clark,
and Polborn 2006; Ahlquist and Levi 2011). In line with this past work:
Assumption 3: If an individual receives a position of leadership, then her
contribution decisions to collective action are more salient among other nonleader group members.
Importantly, as described above, if non-leaders focus especially on leaders’ contributions
when making their own contribution decisions, non-leaders’ behaviors will diverge based
on the leader’s own behaviors:
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Assumption 4a: If a group member’s contribution decisions are more salient
among other group members, and the group member is prosocial, others will
contribute more to collective action.
Assumption 4b: If a group member’s contribution decisions are more salient
among other group members, and the group member is proself, others will
contribute less to collective action.
In the next section, from Assumptions 1 and 2 I derive Hypothesis 1 below, which
argues that the social value orientation of the group leader will moderate leader behavior.
Perhaps more importantly, I also consider how leaders’ behaviors will impact non-leader
group members’ own behaviors—and, ultimately, group level outcomes—following
Assumptions 3 and 4. I describe these hypotheses in turn.

Hypotheses
Assumptions 1 and 2 above suggest that upon obtaining a leadership position,
people will be freer to act according to their preferences; further, prosocials’ and proselfs’
preferences differ. Therefore I predict that the acquisition of a powerful leadership
position will accentuate prosocials’ and proselfs’ pre-existing tendencies to contribute to
collective action. That is, although I expect that prosocials will contribute more than
proselfs in general (i.e., in their baseline contributions during rounds without sanctions), I
also expect these differences will be significantly enhanced among prosocials and
proselfs after they become leaders. I refer to changes in contributions as a result of
obtaining power as first-order effects of power.
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As shown in the causal diagram given in Figure 2.1, I predict that first-order
power effects will be moderated by whether the power holder is prosocial or proself:
Hypothesis 1: Upon receiving the leadership position, prosocial group leaders
will contribute more to collective action. Proself group leaders will contribute
less.

Figure 2.1: Causal Diagram: How Leaders Impact the Rank and File via Power and
Influence Processes
Note: Causal diagram of two routes through which (prosocial) leadership can solve
collective action problems: power and influence. I expect prosocial/proself disposition of
the leader to moderate the relationship between leadership and contribution behavior—
prosocials will contribute more while proselfs will contribute less. I further expect leader
contribution to have a positive impact on contributions of the rank and file. The dotted
arrow predicting that prosocial/proself disposition of the leader moderates second-order
power use indicates that this hypothesis is exploratory (see main text).
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In the previous chapter I have also argued that the leader’s social value orientation
will impact collective outcomes. Specifically, leaders may either enhance or inhibit
collective action via an influence process—that is, leaders’ behavior will be more salient
to non-leaders when making their own choices, such that they will model their behavior
after the leader’s. Thus, if prosocials contribute at higher levels after ascending to
leadership positions, I predict that rank and file members of prosocial-led groups will be
influenced by their leaders’ behavior and will also sacrifice more for the group. Likewise,
if proselfs decrease their contributions in response to attaining leadership, the rank and
file will also contribute less (influence effect, Figure 2.1).
As noted above, research on strong reciprocity suggests we should also observe
second-order power effects, namely that prosocial leaders will be more likely to use
punishment as a means of increasing contributions from the rank and file (second-order
power effect, Figure 2.1). While my main theoretical argument centers on the influence
mechanism, the experiment also allows me to address this additional (non-competing)
route from leaders’ social value orientation to group contributions:
Hypothesis 2: Compared to groups led by proselfs, groups led by prosocials will
contribute more to the public good.
Thus far, the hypotheses have focused on the relative advantages of prosocial
versus proself leadership. Another aim is to compare the effectiveness of groups with
leaders to the standard solution in the collective action literature, in which the power to
sanction is distributed equally among all group members. I begin with contributions and
then turn to earnings.

30

If proselfs reduce their contributions when they rise to leadership positions (and
influence their group members to contribute less as well), we should expect groups led by
proselfs to contribute less than members of groups with peer sanctions, where all group
members have equal power and influence. Likewise, if prosocials increase their
contributions when they become leaders (and influence their group members to
contribute more), prosocial-led groups should contribute more than members of groups
with peer sanctions. Thus, I expect contributions in the peer-punishment groups to fall
between the high contributions of prosocial-led groups and the low contributions of
proself-led groups:
Hypothesis 3a: Compared to peer-punishment groups, prosocial-led groups will
contribute more to the public good.
Hypothesis 3b: Compared to peer-punishment groups, proself-led groups will
contribute less to the public good.
Finally, consider earnings. Earnings from the public good before group members
administer sanctions a direct linear function of contributions. Therefore, earnings before
accounting for the costs of sending and receiving sanctions are expected to follow the
same pattern as in Hypotheses 3a and 3b: compared groups where all are able to sanction
all, prosocial-led groups will earn more from the public good as a direct result of their
higher contributions, while proself-led groups will earn less from the public good. More
interesting is how earnings between leader and leaderless groups will differ after
accounting for the costs of sanctions.
As noted earlier, a fundamental drawback of peer sanctioning systems is the
difficulty of coordinating punishments and, relatedly, the loss of earnings from over-
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punishment and retaliatory counter-punishment. I expect that, after accounting for the
welfare-destroying costs of sanctioning, peer-punishment groups will earn less than
prosocial-led groups, where only one member can punish. I do not offer here a prediction
for how proself-led groups will compare to peer-punishment groups, as it is unclear
whether proself-led groups’ lower contributions (see Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3b) but
comparatively low sanctioning costs will be offset by the higher sanctioning costs but
relatively high contributions in peer sanctioning groups:
Hypothesis 4: After accounting for punishment costs, compared to peerpunishment groups, prosocial-led groups will earn more from the public good.
The next chapter outlines the experiment designed to test these hypotheses. More
generally, the experiment allows me to address whether group-level outcomes differ
across leader types, whether this occurs via power, influence, or both, and whether the
(prosocial) leader solution is as effective, or more effective, than the standard peer
sanctioning solution.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 1
Here I outline the experiment designed to test the theory outlined in the previous
chapter. More generally, the study described below allows me to address whether grouplevel outcomes (i.e., contributions to and earnings from the public good) differ across the
two leader types, whether these differences occur via power, influence, or both, and
whether the (prosocial) leader solution is as effective, or more effective, than the standard
peer sanctioning solution.

Participants and Design
Participants were recruited from large introductory classes at the University of
South Carolina. Each session was conducted in a group of four and each group was
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions: prosocial leader, proself leader, or
peer punishment. 78 groups (312 participants; 182 female) completed the study in
exchange for payment.
All groups first completed a standard repeated version of a public good dilemma
with no punishment ability (e.g. Sell and Wilson 1991; Willer 2009). Then, each group
participated in additional rounds of the game under new rules, which varied by condition.
In two conditions, only one (ostensibly randomly selected) participant could punish his or
her group members. In one of these, the group member with punishment ability had been
categorized as prosocial. In the other, this group member was a proself. I refer to these
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conditions as the prosocial leader and proself leader conditions, respectively. In the third
condition, all group members were able to punish (the peer punishment condition). This
condition, where all can punish all, is the standard one in the literature on sanctions in
public good situations (e.g. Fehr and Gachter 2002; Ostrom et al. 1992; for a review, see
Shinada and Yamagishi 2007).

Procedure
Upon their arrival to the lab, participants were escorted to a private room where
they were unable to see or communicate with other group members. Participants
completed a consent form before beginning the computerized task, which was
programmed using z-Tree version 3.3.11 (Fischbacher 2007).
The task began with a series of pre-study questions, including a standard measure
of social value orientation (Van Lange et al. 1997, see Appendix A). The measure
presented participants with a series of nine decomposed games, each consisting of three
different distributions of points for self and another (unidentified) person. The other was
described as “someone you do not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the
future.” As noted earlier, two of the three distributions (individualist and competitive)
correspond to “proself” responses and the third is a “prosocial” response. Aside from
measuring participants’ preferences for prosocial or proself outcomes, I also used scores
on the social value orientation (SVO) scale to assign the leader in the prosocial and
proself leader conditions, as described below. At no point during the study were
participants told that their responses on the SVO scale would be used to determine who
would occupy the leader role.
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After everyone completed the pre-study questionnaire, the computer advanced to
instructions for a standard public good game without punishment. The description of the
task began by stating that while participants would be working in a group with three
others, at no point would they see or meet the other group members; nor would their
group members see or meet them. After assuring participants of their anonymity, they
were told that the study would consist of a series of choices in an “investment decision
task” and that their and their group members’ decisions in the task would affect their
earnings in the study. Specifically,

At the start of each round, you (and each of your other group members) get 20
points. You can contribute anywhere from 0 to 20 of these points to a "group
fund." Any points you do not contribute to the group fund remain in your personal
fund, for you to keep.

Anything that is contributed to the group fund will be doubled. Then, the doubled
amount will be divided between all four of the members of your group, whether or
not they contributed to the group fund. (Similarly, other group members'
contributions to the group fund will be doubled and redistributed equally among
all members of the group.) Your total earnings per round are your share of the
earnings from the group fund, plus whatever you did not invest.

After reading through the instructions and several examples, participants answered quiz
questions to ensure their comprehension (see Appendix B for the full text of all Study 1
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instructions). The vast majority of participants were able to answer all quiz questions
correctly. Incorrect answers to the quiz questions were followed by a detailed explanation
of the correct answer.
The public good task began after everyone completed the quiz. Each participant
was prompted to enter a whole number from zero to twenty to indicate how much they
wished to contribute to the group fund. After all participants had answered, everyone was
able to see their own contribution and earnings, as well as the contributions and earnings
of each other group member. Once everyone finished reviewing the results, participants
proceeded to the next round, where they again decided how much of a new twenty-point
endowment to contribute to the group. This process was repeated for a total of six rounds.
Participants were not told in advance how many rounds they would complete.
Once the sixth round was completed, a new set of instructions explained that for
the subsequent portion of the study, some of the rules of the investment decision task
would change. The description of these new rules varied by condition: either peerpunishment or leader. Instructions for the two leader conditions—prosocial leader and
proself leader—were identical. (To avoid demand effects, at no point in the instructions
was the participant given the leader role referred to as the “leader.”) The description of
the rule change for each condition was as follows [instructions for leader conditions in
brackets]:

Under the new rules, every group member [one group member (chosen at
random)] will have the opportunity to deduct points from their fellow group
members following each round.
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Specifically, after each round (that is, after all members' contributions for that
round are known), everyone [one person] will be able to deduct points from their
group members' earnings, if they choose to do so. It costs 1 point to deduct 3
points from another group member. For example, if a [the] group member
chooses to spend two of his/her points to deduct points from Participant X,
Participant X's earnings will be reduced by six points.

Group members can spend anywhere from 0 to 10 of their own points to deduct
points from each of their group members.

[On a later screen, we will let you and your group members know who has been
randomly assigned to the role described above. Whoever is randomly selected will
continue in this role for the remainder of the study.]

As in the no-punishment phase of the study, participants read through several
examples and completed quiz questions (see Appendix B). Once everyone had completed
the quiz, participants in the leader conditions were shown one final screen where they
were given the ID number of the person (ostensibly randomly) assigned to be the leader.
Depending on condition, I used scores on the social value orientation measure,
administered in the beginning of the study, to select the leader. In the proself leader
condition, the group member with the fewest number of prosocial answers (i.e. a high
number of proself answers) was assigned to the leader role. In the prosocial leader
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condition, the group member with the most prosocial answers was assigned to the leader
position. In case of a tie, the leader was chosen randomly from among the most prosocial
(prosocial leader condition) or most proself (proself leader condition) individuals. All
participants in the leader conditions were told whether or not they had been assigned to
the leader position—or if not, the ID number of the participant who had (ostensibly
randomly) received the leader role—before advancing to the punishment phase of the
study.
The rounds with punishment began similarly to the rounds without punishment.
All group members made simultaneous contribution decisions and then viewed the
results, including each group member’s contribution and earnings. Then, non-leaders in
the leader conditions were told to wait while the leader made his or her deduction
decisions. Those who were leaders were again shown each other group member’s
contribution and earnings. Below that information, they indicated whether (and if so, how
much) they wished to deduct from each person’s earnings. For the peer-punishment
condition, each participant viewed an identical screen and made deduction decisions.
Once those who could deduct points had done so, all group members could view their and
others’ outcomes after deductions—including how many deductions they had received
and their final earnings for the round. In the peer-punishment condition, participants
could see the ID numbers of who punished whom. This process was repeated for an
additional six rounds. As in the no-punishment phase of the study, participants were not
told the number of rounds in advance.
Once the punishment phase of the public good task was completed, participants
were paid based on their earnings across the twelve rounds of the study (ranging from
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$10 to $15), probed for suspicion, and debriefed. Each session lasted approximately
forty-five minutes.

Results
I used the nine-item social value orientation scale, completed at the beginning of
the study, to categorize participants’ social value orientation. Following past work, I
combined individualists and competitors into one “proself” category (Simpson and Willer
2008; Van Lange et al. 1997). As is standard in the social value orientation literature
(Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 1997), a participant was classified as a given
social value type when he or she answered at least six of the nine items consistently.
Six groups were omitted from analyses (four in the prosocial leader and two in the
proself leader conditions) because no group member qualified as prosocial or proself,
respectively. In the leadership conditions, the experimental software selected the
individual with the highest prosocial or proself score to be leader, depending on
condition. In three groups, this resulted in a participant who could not be classified as
either prosocial or proself becoming the leader. In the remaining three groups, a proself
was assigned to lead a group originally designated a prosocial leader condition. After
omitting these six groups, analyses were performed on the remaining 72 groups of four,
or 288 participants (166 female). These groups were fairly evenly distributed across the
prosocial leader (25 groups), proself leader (22), and peer-punishment (25) conditions. Of
the 288 participants included in the study, 119 (42%) were classified as prosocial, 143
(49%) as proself, and 26 (9.2%) could not be classified.

39

Because the data were nested (rounds within participants within groups), most of
the analyses reported below employ three-level multilevel models with random intercepts
for participants and groups. Multilevel modeling allows for the simultaneous analysis of
different levels of data without violating the assumptions of independence required for
traditional regression (Snijders and Bosker 2012).

Preliminary Analyses
Prior to evaluating the hypotheses, I performed some preliminary analyses. First,
all groups completed six non-punishment rounds at the beginning of the study. The
instructions and procedures for this phase of the study were identical across conditions.
Therefore, there should not be significant differences in contributions between conditions
in the non-punishment phase. Any differences between conditions before the
manipulation had occurred would suggest a failure of random assignment. It would also
suggest that any differences observed in the punishment rounds may be due not to effects
of the leadership manipulation, but to pre-existing differences between groups. Therefore,
I first examined contributions in the non-punishment phase of the study by condition.
Results for the non-punishment rounds are displayed in Table 4.1. As expected,
there were no significant differences in contributions between the prosocial leader,
proself leader, or peer punishment conditions in the non-punishment phase (ps > .8).
There was an effect of round: within the six rounds where punishment was not possible,
contributions declined significantly over time (p < .001); this pattern was the same in all
conditions (see non-punishment rounds, Figure 4.1). The degeneration of contributions
over time is a standard finding in the literature (e.g. Ostrom 2000; Sell and Wilson 1991)
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and is one of the key problems for groups facing collective action situations. Peer
sanctioning is the standard solution proffered by the literature for avoiding this spiral of
non-cooperation and maintaining high levels of contributions over time (Fehr and
Gachter 2002).

Table 4.1: Contributions to the Public Good, Non-Punishment Rounds
B (SE)
Intercept

8.78 (.83)***

Proself leader condition

-.23 (1.18)

Peer punishment condition

.27 (1.14)

Round

-.59 (.06)***
Nrounds (groups) = 1728 (72)

Note: * p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001
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Figure 4.1: Average Group Contributions in Non-Punishment and Punishment
Rounds, by Condition
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Additional preliminary analyses were conducted to determine if the leader
selection process resulted in groups that differed in the distribution of gender or nonleader social value orientations. Specifically, in the leader conditions, the most prosocial
or proself group member was selected to be leader. Although evidence for gender
differences in social value orientation is mixed at best (Van Lange et al. 1997; Van Lange
1999), I considered whether the gender of the leader was approximately equally
distributed across the prosocial and proself leader conditions. That is, if leaders were
more likely to be men vs. women in one condition compared to the other, this could result
in differences by condition based on the group leaders’ gender, rather than the group
leaders’ social value orientation alone. A chi-square test, however, revealed that there
was no significant difference in the gender distribution of the leaders by condition, χ2 (1)
= 1.95, p = .16.
Additionally, I considered whether, as a result of selecting the most prosocial (or
proself) group member for the leadership position, the social value orientations of the
remaining group members (i.e., the rank and file group members) were unevenly
distributed across conditions. For instance, selecting the most prosocial group member to
be leader might have resulted in a more heavily proself rank and file in the prosocial
leader condition. Likewise, selecting the most proself group member to be leader may
have resulted in a more heavily prosocial rank and file in the proself leader groups.
However, a chi-square test revealed that non-leader group members’ SVOs were
distributed approximately equally across the prosocial and proself leader conditions, χ2
(1) = 1.323, p = .25.
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Change in Contributions, Non-punishment to Punishment Rounds
As described in the previous section, and as anticipated, contributions did not
differ across conditions in the non-punishment rounds. Following the non-punishment
rounds, participants were told either that all participants or one randomly selected
participant would be able to make deductions from the group members’ earnings. How
did the introduction of sanctions impact contributions to the public good?
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed that group-level contributions increased
significantly from the final round of the non-punishment phase to the initial round of the
punishment phase in all three conditions (p < .03). Further, a two-level (participants
within groups) multilevel model with contributions in just the first round of the
punishment phase as the outcome variable suggested that first-round contributions did not
differ by condition (p > .3). Taken together, these results suggest that the introduction of
each type of sanctioning system (leader or peer-punishment) immediately increased
contributions to the public good, and at similar levels, before the leader (or all group
members, in the peer-punishment condition) had a chance to sanction.
I now turn to the first hypothesis by considering changes in individual-level
contribution behavior after the introduction of sanctions—and, for the leaders, after
receiving the leadership position. To do so, I examined how both condition and leader
status impacted the difference in contributions between the six rounds where punishment
was possible and the six rounds where it was not. This model allows for the assessment
of whether leaders’ contributions changed in the rounds in which they had sole ability to
punish their group members, and also how non-leaders’ contributions changed as well.
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Because these models contain variables for leadership status, they are based only on the
47 groups in the two leader conditions; peer-punishment groups were omitted from these
analyses and are discussed later in the chapter.
Results of a model with change in contributions as the outcome variable and
random intercepts at the group level revealed a main effect of condition: those in the
proself leader condition contributed less in the punishment rounds, compared to those in
the prosocial leader condition (p = .04). The main effect was qualified by a significant
condition x leader status interaction: proself leaders, in particular, contributed less in the
six punishment rounds than they did in the six non-punishment rounds (p = .03, see Table
4.2 and Figure 4.2). While proself leaders contributed an average of 10.0 points less than
they contributed before they became leaders, prosocials contributed, on average, 4.0
points more when they became leaders. The findings lend support to the person x
situation approach, and Hypothesis 1: although proselfs who received the leadership role
decreased their contributions to the group, I observed the opposite pattern for prosocials.

Table 4.2: Change in Total Contributions, Non-Punishment Rounds to Punishment
Rounds
B (SE)
Intercept

15.51 (3.57)***

Proself leader condition

-9.81 (4.71)*

Contribution, non-punishment rounds

.23 (3.46)

Is leader

1.96 (3.46)

Proself leader condition*Is leader

-11.25 (5.13)***

Nparticipants (groups) = 188 (47)
Note: + p < .10

* p < .05

** p < .01
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*** p < .001

10
8
6
4
2

Leaders

0

Non-Leaders

-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
Figure 4.2: Change in Total Contributions, Non-Punishment Rounds to Punishment
Rounds, by Condition and Leader Status
Note: figure displays the difference between leaders and non-leaders’ total contributions
in the six non-punishment rounds and their total contributions in the six punishment
rounds. Positive numbers indicate that total contribution was higher in the punishment
rounds than in the non-punishment rounds. Prosocial groups (i.e., leaders and nonleaders together) contributed more in the punishment rounds than proself groups; in the
proself leader condition, proself leaders decreased their contributions to a greater extent
than did their followers. The difference between prosocial leaders and their followers
was not significant. See main text for analyses.

The significant main effect of condition in this model supports Hypothesis 2: it
suggests that non-leaders in the proself condition also contributed less during the six
punishment rounds, compared to non-leaders in the prosocial leader condition (see Figure

45

3). That is, proself leaders, and their followers, actually gave less than they had when
there was no sanctioning system at all, while prosocial leaders and their followers gave
more. The next section more closely examines the mechanisms through which
contributions to groups in these two conditions diverged.

Do Leaders Impact Contributions from the Rank and File via Influence, Power, or Both?
Thus far I have shown that even after controlling for their baseline tendencies
during non-punishment rounds, proselfs decrease their contributions further when they
become leaders. Further, Figure 4.2 and the change in contributions model in Table 4.2
suggest that non-leaders’ contributions fell in line with their respective leader’s
contributions, suggesting the predicted influence process. To formally test this prediction,
I next assessed whether leaders’ contribution decisions in a previous round predict nonleaders’ contributions in the current round (Table 4.3, Model 1).
I also address the possibility that group members did not favor leaders in
particular, but instead used the behavior of all group members in the previous round (i.e.,
both leaders and non-leaders) when making their contribution decision. Further, it is
possible that group members were not responding to leaders’ contribution behaviors in
the previous round, but rather to leaders’ use of punishment in the previous round, when
they made their own contribution choices. To ensure that leaders’ contributions in
particular influenced non-leaders’ contribution decisions, in a second model I included
two additional predictors: average contribution of the other two rank and file members in
the previous round and leaders’ expenditure on punishment of the three rank and file
members in the previous round.
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Table 4.3: Leaders’ Previous Contribution Decision Predicts Non-Leaders’ Current
Contribution Decision

Intercept

Model 1
B (SE)
.85 (.76)

Model 2
B (SE)
.02 (.70)

Proself leader condition

.52 (.66)

.31 (.55)

Round
Contribution, non-punishment
rounds
Contribution, previous round
Other non-leaders’
contribution, previous round
Leader’s expenditure on
punishment, previous round
Leader’s contribution,
previous round

.08 (.11)

.11 (.11)

.20 (.03)***

.20 (.03)***

.41 (.03)***

.43 (.03)***
.04 (.02)*
.10 (.05)*

.20 (.04)***

.17 (.04)***

Nrounds (groups) = 705 (47)
Note: + p < .10

* p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001

Not surprisingly, this final model (Table 4.3, Model 2) revealed a significant
effect of other non-leader group members’ contributions in the previous round on own
contribution decision in the current round (p = .04) and of leaders’ use of punishment in
the previous round on own contribution decision in the current round (p = .04). However,
as expected, the effect of the leaders’ previous contribution on non-leaders’ contribution
in the current round was highly significant (p < .001), suggesting that participants used
the leader’s own contribution behavior in particular as a cue for how much to contribute.
There was no interaction with condition (p = .8); thus, although the prosocial- and proself
leaders tended to lead their groups in opposite directions, the magnitude of their influence
was similar.
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A mediation analysis revealed that the group-level contribution difference
between conditions was fully mediated by the leader’s influence (see Figure 4.3).
Although condition significantly predicted contributions in a given round (p < .05), and
condition significantly predicted leader’s contribution in the previous round (p < .001),
the effect of condition on contributions became non-significant after controlling for
leader’s behavior in the previous round. This suggests that the group-level differences in
contributions were driven largely by the effect of the leader, specifically, the leader’s
influence on the rank and file’s own contribution patterns.

Figure 4.3 Mediation Analyses: Leaders’ Previous Behavior Mediates the
Relationship between Condition and Group Contributions
Note: Figure gives results for mediation analyses showing that in a given round, the
effect of the prosocial (vs. proself) leader condition on contributions was mediated by the
leader’s behavior in the previous round. The effect of condition on contributions becomes
nonsignificant after controlling for leader’s behavior in the previous round. All models
controlled for contributions in the non-punishment rounds, round, and leader status.
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The forgoing analyses show that leaders’ contributions had a powerful and
significant influence on non-leaders’ subsequent contributions. And because prosocial
leaders, but not proself leaders, contributed at high levels after ascending to the
leadership position, the rank and file contributed at higher levels and prosocial-led groups
as a whole were better off. Did leaders differ in their exercise of power—that is, their use
of punishment? Figure 4.4 shows that prosocial and proself leaders did not differ in how
much they punished (p > .7). Moreover, the average contribution of those who were
subsequently punished (and the average contribution of those who were not subsequently
punished) did not differ by leader type (p = .35)—the average punished person
contributed, on average, 4.2 points to the group in the proself leader condition and 4.9
points to the group in the prosocial leader condition.
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Figure 4.4: Average Earnings Deductions Received, by Round and Condition
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Note: Higher values indicate greater earnings loss. For the two leader conditions, the
maximum a given group member could lose was thirty points (the leader could spend up
to ten points to punish a given group member up to thirty points). For the peer
punishment condition, the maximum was ninety points (thirty points from each of three
group members).

However, as described above, prosocial and proself leaders did not contribute to
the group equally, even though they tended to punish equally. This suggests that proself
leaders frequently engaged in hypocritical punishment of their fellow group members
(Heckathorn 1990; Helbing et al. 2014)—that is, they were significantly more likely than
their prosocial counterparts to punish rank and file members who contributed as much, or
more than, they themselves had. Indeed, of the instances where a rank and file group
member was punished by a proself leader, the target of punishment had contributed as
much or more than the leader 73% of the time. The opposite pattern was observed for
prosocials. For prosocial leaders, in 70% of the instances where they punished, the
punishment was directed at someone who had contributed less than the leader (Figure
4.5).
Similarly, although the average individual punished by both a prosocial and a
proself contributed about 4-5 points, as noted above, prosocials who punished at least
one other group member had contributed, on average, 10.1 points; proselfs who punished,
on the other hand, had contributed 3.0 points—less than the average amount (4.2 points)
for which they were punishing others.
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leader
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Punished by Proself
Leader (N=118)

Punished by Prosocial
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Figure 4.5: Punished Group Members’ Contributions vs. Leader’s (Punisher’s)
Contributions
Note: Figure displays the 118 (122) instances where a rank and file group member was
punished by a proself (prosocial) leader. Displayed here is the percentage of those
instances where the punished rank and file group member had contributed as much or
more than the leader (punisher) had, vs. contributed less than the leader (punisher) had.

How Does Leadership Compare to Peer Sanctioning?
Next I turn to comparing groups in the standard peer sanctioning condition with
leader groups to test Hypothesis 3: did public good provision differ by type of
sanctioning system? As noted above, contributions in the first round (i.e., before
sanctions took place) did not differ by condition. However, contribution patterns by
condition diverged substantially across the six rounds (see punishment rounds, Figure 2).
Specifically, the model in Table 4.4 shows a condition x round interaction: consistent
with the individual-level analyses described above, groups in the proself leader condition
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contributed less over the six punishment rounds, compared to prosocial-led groups (p <
.01). Thus, as already suggested and in line with Hypothesis 2, prosocial-led groups
produced larger public goods than proself-led groups. As described above, this was
driven by both leaders and non-leaders in the proself-led groups contributing less than
leaders and non-leaders in prosocial-led groups.

Table 4.4: Contributions to the Public Good, Punishment Rounds
B (SE)
Intercept

5.96 (.87)***

Proself leader condition

-.91 (1.26)

Peer punishment condition

.76 (1.22)

Round

.16 (.09)+

Contribution, non-punishment rounds

.19 (.02)***

Proself leader condition*Round

-.38 (.12)**

Peer punishment condition*Round

-.24 (.12)*

Nrounds (groups) = 1728 (72)
Note: + p < .10

* p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001

I also expected (Hypothesis 3a) that prosocial-led groups will be more effective
than groups where sanctioning power is equally distributed to all group members.
Consistent with this hypothesis, this model also shows that peer sanctioning groups
contributed less over time than those led by a prosocial (p < .05). That is, although both
types of groups initially contributed at higher levels under a sanctioning system than they
had under no sanctioning system at all, groups with prosocial leaders were more
successful than the standard sanctioning system at maintaining high contributions over
time. Finally, proself-led groups contributed somewhat less over time than peer-
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punishment groups, but the difference was not significant (p = .27). The findings, then,
support Hypothesis 3a: prosocial-led groups, as a whole, were more successful at
producing the public good than were groups using the standard solution, peer
punishment. Hypothesis 3b, that proself-led groups would be worse off than peerpunishment groups, was not supported. Rather, standard peer sanctioning groups fared no
better than groups led by proselfs.

Punishment
That contributions in prosocial-led groups were higher than those in peerpunishment groups is noteworthy given that the risk of being sanctioned, and the amount
that one could be sanctioned, was three times higher in peer-punishment groups. Each
member of peer-punishment groups risked being punished by three others; in groups with
leadership structures, rank and file members risked being punished only by the leader and
leaders could not be punished at all. Simply based on the number of people who have the
capacity to administer punishment, it is likely that significantly more resources are likely
to be destroyed in groups where punishment ability is decentralized across all group
members.
Indeed, Figure 4.4 above and the model in Table 4.5 show that those in peerpunishment systems were punished far more than those in either the prosocial- or proselfled groups (ps < .001), even controlling for how much they contributed, which was itself
a significant predictor of punishment (p < .001). On the other hand, prosocial- and
proself-led group members were punished to a similar extent, as already noted.
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Table 4.5: Earnings Deductions Received, Punishment Rounds
B (SE)
Intercept

5.26 (1.00)***

Proself leader condition

-.05 (1.36)

Peer punishment condition

5.17 (1.31)***

Round

-.03 (.08)

Contribution, punishment rounds

-.44 (.03)***

Nrounds (groups) = 1446 (72)
Note: + p < .10

* p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001

These findings on punishment are important for two reasons. First, the increased
contributions observed over time in the prosocial leader condition, compared to both
proself leader and peer-punishment groups, cannot be explained by a failure to punish
free-riding behavior in the latter conditions. Prosocial-led groups did not produce more of
the public good than their proself-led counterparts because proself leaders failed to
punish—rather, the two types of leaders did not differ in their punishment behavior. And
although groups with prosocial leaders also maintained high contributions over time
compared to peer-punishment groups, group members led by prosocials were punished
significantly less than members of groups using peer punishment. Second, because a
single person was responsible for administering sanctions in the two leadership structure
conditions, those conditions resulted in far fewer welfare-destroying sanctions, compared
to the standard peer sanctioning solution. Even controlling for contributions, those in the
peer-punishment condition were punished significantly more than those in groups with
leaders.
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Earnings, Punishment Rounds
Finally I turn to differences in earnings, after accounting for punishment costs.
Figure 4.6 displays group-level earnings from the public good after subtracting out costs
from punishments administered to other group members and/or punishments received
from other group members.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, peer-punishment groups earned significantly less
from the public good overall than groups in the prosocial leader condition (p < .01).
Indeed, although they contributed less than peer punishment groups, even proself-led
groups, on the whole, earned more from the public good than peer punishment groups,
due to the increased rates of punishment in the latter groups (p = .03) (Figure 4.6 and
Table 4.6).
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Figure 4.6: Average Earnings after Punishment, by Round and Condition
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Table 4.6: Earnings, Punishment Rounds
B (SE)
Intercept

20.21 (1.49)***

Proself leader condition

3.24 (2.18)

Prosocial leader condition

5.17 (1.31)***

Round

-.48 (.15)***
Nrounds (groups) = 1728 (72)

Note: + p < .10

* p < .05

** p < .01

*** p < .001

On one hand, perhaps this finding should not be surprising, given that members of
peer-punishment groups could be punished up to three times as much as lay-members of
groups with leaders. On the other hand, the results are striking when we consider that
peer sanctioning is the standard solution in the behavioral economics literature. Peerpunishment groups yielded similar contribution rates, and significantly lower earnings,
than groups led by proselfs, who contributed at low levels (and influenced others to do
so) and punished hypocritically.

Discussion
In sum, the results from Study 1 supported the key predictions. Consistent with
Hypothesis 1, prosocials who received the leader position contributed more than they had
in the non-punishment rounds; proselfs who received the leader position, on the other
hand, significantly decreased their contributions. This occurred above and beyond the
baseline differences in their behaviors in the non-punishment rounds. Further, the results
also suggest that leaders’ social value orientations impact group outcomes as a whole, in
support of Hypothesis 2—proself-led groups were worse off than prosocial-led groups,
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which produced larger public goods. Findings revealed that the leaders’ impact on group
outcomes was due to leaders’ influencing their group members’ contributions—leaders’
behaviors in particular were significantly associated with their followers’ contributions in
subsequent rounds. I also suggested that differences in the exercise of power among
prosocial vs. proself leaders could impact rank and file contributions; however, there was
no evidence that prosocials and proselfs punished at different rates. Rather, the difference
between prosocial and proself leadership is driven by the impact of power on the leader’s
own contributions decisions, and the subsequent influence of the leaders’ behavior on his
or her group members.
Perhaps more importantly, another aim of Study 1 was to examine whether
leadership was as effective as what is considered the standard solution to public good
dilemmas in the sociological and social-psychological literature: peer to peer sanctions.
In Hypothesis 3, I predicted that peer-punishment groups would contribute less than
prosocial-led groups (Hypothesis 3a) but more than proself-led groups (Hypothesis 3b),
given the predictions that power would increase prosocials’ (and their group members’)
contributions but decrease proselfs’ (and their group members’) contributions.
Hypothesis 3a was supported, but Hypothesis 3b was not—peer-punishment group
members contributed at similar levels to proself-led groups. This result suggest that the
peer-punishment solution is not the most viable one for increasing public good
production: rather, prosocial leadership allows groups to build larger public goods.
Hypothesis 4, that peer-punishment groups would earn less than leader groups after
accounting for the increased punishment costs that occur by allowing all group members
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to punish, was supported—thus lending more support to the claim that the leadership
solution is the better solution.
Although the arguments and findings of Study 1 advance an understanding of
when and why leadership promotes collective action, Study 1 had several limitations.
One important limitation was that in order to compare the effectiveness of prosocial
versus proself leaders, I appointed members—either the most prosocial group member or
the more proself group member—to leadership. But leaders of real-world groups are
often selected by their members. Thus, one important question is whether (and how) realworld groups tend to select group-beneficial, i.e., prosocial, leaders.
Although some research is suggestive (e.g., Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck
2002), I know of no prior work that directly answers this question. But if groups are
unable or unwilling to select prosocials for leadership positions, the leader “solution”
may not be a solution at all. Therefore, in Study 2a I conducted a vignette study to
preliminarily address whether people facing a collective action problem, like the one in
the study reported above, would have selected prosocials as leaders. In Study 2b I
conducted a second experiment to consider whether allowing group members to elect
their leaders enhances public good production not only once the leader is elected, but also
before the leader is elected. That is, do group members behave more prosocially when
they anticipate being elected to leadership? And if so, how does this ultimately impact
group members’ ability to select prosocials as leaders? Given that prosocial leaders in
particular enhance public good production, determining whether (and how) real-world
groups tend to select group-beneficial, i.e., prosocial, leaders, will be key for determining
whether leadership will ultimately help or harm groups.
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CHAPTER 5
LEADER ELECTION VS. APPOINTMENT
To compare the effectiveness of prosocial versus proself leaders, in Study 1
leaders were appointed to their positions via random assignment by the experimental
program. And, following the argument detailed above, the results demonstrate that the
benefits of leadership accrue mainly to groups led by prosocials. But leaders of realworld groups are often selected by their members via democratic elections rather than
appointment (Grossman and Baldassarri 2012). Thus, one important question that Study 1
does not address is whether (and how) real-world groups tend to select group-beneficial,
i.e., prosocial, leaders. If not, then the results of Study 1 suggest that the leader “solution”
will not be a solution at all.
Some of the past work on granting sole punishment ability to a single group
member has appointed the group leader (O’Gorman et al. 2009), while others have
considered elected leaders (Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015; Van Vugt and De Cremer 1999) or
have directly compared appointed to elected leadership (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011;
Grossman and Baldassarri 2012). Yet, as described previously, in most past work
considering election (or appointment) of leaders to solve public goods problems, the
leader was completely external to the group and thus had not, and did not, contribute to
group efforts. The only exceptions (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Grossman and
Baldassarri 2012) allowed group members to select the leader from among those in their
group after two rounds of the public good dilemma, but groups did so without knowing
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each others’ (i.e., the potential leaders’) contribution behaviors. Rather, group members’
prior contribution behaviors were kept anonymous before the leader was chosen.6
Therefore, prior studies have placed limits on whether and how group members can select
their leaders on the basis of their prosocial (or proself) actions. Do groups tend to select
their more prosocial members to lead?
Although no work has directly considered this question, much past research
suggests that those who engage in prosocial behaviors are more likely to be rewarded
with a variety of reputational and material benefits. Indeed, reciprocity is considered a
key explanation for why people engage in prosocial behaviors toward unrelated others,
even when those others may be unable to directly reciprocate their actions (Nowak and
Sigmund 2000, 2005; Molm 2010; Simpson and Willer 2008). Reciprocity can be either
direct or indirect (Molm and Cook 1995; Molm et al. 2007). In direct reciprocity, otherregarding behaviors are returned by the receiver, e.g., A gives to B because B gave to A.
Indirect reciprocity, on the other hand, occurs when people help those who have helped
others, e.g., A gives to B because B gave to C.
Both direct and indirect reciprocity can explain why people grant power and
status—including leadership positions—to others. For example, past work has
demonstrated that donors to charity receive more votes, from third party observers, for a

6

Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that these studies did not find that people tended to elect their higher

contributing group members to the leader position. Rather, elected leaders were no more cooperative in the
public good dilemma than were their randomly appointed counterparts (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011;
Grossman and Baldassarri 2012)—likely because voters could not be certain who had behaved prosocially
and who had not when casting their votes.
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powerful political position (Milinski et al. 2002). And those who contribute more to
collective action are awarded more status by their fellow group members (Willer 2009).
More generally, that leaders and followers mutually provide benefits to each other
has been considered a key explanation for why leadership has evolved among humans
and other species. Price and Van Vugt’s “service for prestige” theory of leadership
proposes that people provide leaders with the status and prestige of the leadership
position; in return, leaders are expected to provide followers with collectively shared
benefits and resources. That is, people award leadership positions to those who they
perceive as worthy of the position—specifically, those who are able and willing to benefit
followers (Price and Van Vugt 2014).
Therefore, the work reviewed above suggests that people will prefer to award
leadership to prosocials. But as noted earlier, no work has directly tested this question.
Studies 2a and 2b were designed to address whether people facing a collective action
problem, as in Study 1 reported above, would select prosocials as leaders. If not, the
“leader solution” may not be an effective solution after all, given that proself-led groups
were worse off than those led by prosocials and those with no leaders at all. But
following past work on reciprocity and the disproportionate rewarding of power and
status to more other-regarding group members, I expected that, given the ability to
choose their leaders, groups tend to select prosocials for the position:
Hypothesis 6: Given the ability to elect their leaders, people will
disproportionately vote for other-regarding, vs. self-regarding, group members.
To test Hypothesis 6, Studies 2a and 2b allow group members to elect their
leaders—unlike in Study 1, where leaders were appointed. But allowing group members
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to elect their leaders may provide a host of additional benefits to groups facing collective
action problems. In the sections to follow, I consider how the election—versus
appointment—of leaders will further benefit groups, above and beyond the benefits given
by the appointed leadership structure tested in Study 1.
Specifically, I consider whether election to leadership promotes public good
production in two ways. First, past work that has compared appointed to elected leader
systems has consistently shown that electing leaders enhances public good production
after the leader is installed (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; De Cremer and Van Dijk
2008; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012). But second, I consider an additional mechanism
by which leader election (vs. appointment) can promote public good production—by
allowing group members to compete for leadership before the election takes place. I
discuss this additional mechanism in the next section.

Do People Compete for Leadership?
As described above, much past research suggests that those who engage in
prosocial behaviors are more likely to be rewarded with a variety of reputational and
material benefits. Importantly, past work also suggests that people respond strategically
to the presence or absence of these benefits (e.g., Nowak and Sigmund 2005).
Cooperation in social dilemmas is higher when individuals expect to be rewarded for
engaging in prosocial behavior—but when the receipt of these rewards is no longer
possible, cooperation decreases dramatically (Milinski et al. 2002). Relatedly, people
contribute significantly more to public goods when they anticipate receiving greater
status and prestige for their cooperation (Barclay and Willer 2007; Hardy and Van Vugt
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2006; Willer 2009). More generally, this work suggests that people will behave in more
other-regarding ways when they can receive material or non-material rewards for doing
so.
Thus far, I have suggested that people will prefer to confer power and status on
their more other-regarding group members. That is, given the ability to choose their
leaders, groups will tend to select their more cooperative group members for the position.
But importantly, the work described above suggests that when people anticipate receiving
benefits (including, as discussed above, power and status) from behaving prosocially,
they increase their cooperative behavior. This strategic behavior can result in competitive
prosociality, such that people actively compete to be more generous when they can
benefit from being chosen by their group members for special positions (Barclay 2004;
Barclay and Willer 2007; Hardy and Van Vugt 2006). People enjoy the social and
material rewards that come with power and status—and positions of leadership generally
come with both (Lovaglia et al. 2006). Thus, I argue that expected or anticipated
elections may trigger motivations to be elected, and that leads people to contribute more
to group efforts—even before the leader is installed. A key consequence of this is that the
possibility of leadership vacancies leads to higher contributions, something that has been
overlooked in prior work on the leader solution to collective action problems.
Following the work described above, in Study 2b I consider whether people
compete for the leadership position, by engaging in more cooperative behaviors (i.e.,
contribution to the public good) when they know a leader will be democratically elected
by the group rather than exogenously imposed:
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Hypothesis 7a: When they can receive the leadership position via election (vs.
random assignment), group members will contribute more to the public good.
Importantly, although reputation systems are considered a key explanation for
why people engage in other-regarding behavior, people still cooperate even in
anonymous, one-shot interactions—that is, even in situations where material or social
benefits for cooperating are not possible (Fehr and Gintis 2007; Kollock 1998). Some
past work has shown that prosocials are less sensitive to the possibility of reputation
formation than are proselfs (Simpson and Willer 2008). This work demonstrates that
prosocials tend to cooperate whether there is the possibility for incentives or not. On the
other hand, proselfs engage in other-regarding behaviors only in the presence of
incentives that encourage them to do so. From this perspective, then, it is possible that the
competition for leadership effect will be moderated by social value orientation. This
would suggest that proselfs in particular will behave more cooperatively when they can
compete for the leadership role. Thus, an alternative to Hypothesis 7a (which predicts
that both prosocials and proselfs compete for leadership) is that proselfs, in particular,
will compete:
Hypothesis 7b: When they can receive the leadership position via election (vs.
random assignment), proselfs, but not prosocials, will contribute more to the
public good.
Importantly, if Hypothesis 7b is supported, prosocials and proselfs who know that
a leader will later be elected may contribute at similar rates—that is, prosocials contribute
at high rates regardless of whether incentives are available or not, while proselfs in
particular raise their contributions in order to compete for leadership. Indeed,
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contributions patterns may be so similar that, when the election takes place, group
members may not be able to identify prosocials for the leadership position. Rather, they
might select proselfs who have competed for the position—and those proselfs may or
may not continue contributing at high rates once they have received leadership. Thus not
only does Study 2a consider whether people prefer prosocials as leaders (Hypothesis 6),
Study 2b does as well: can people identify prosocials and select them as leaders—even
when competition for leadership is possible?
Hypotheses 7a and 7b suggest that elected leadership systems (vs. exogenously
imposed leadership) may benefit groups facing public good dilemmas even before the
leader is installed, if people compete for leadership. While prior work has overlooked
this mechanism by which elected leadership may benefit public good production, some
past research has considered whether elected vs. appointed leadership impacts public
good production after the leader is installed. Aside from competition for leadership
before the leader is elected, in the next section I also consider whether the election
process will promote cooperation after the elected leader receives the position. That is, do
groups produce larger public goods when they are led by an elected (vs. appointed) group
member?

Leader Election vs. Appointment
Past work has consistently shown that allowing group members to elect their
leaders is associated with higher levels of contribution in public good dilemmas
(Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Dal Bo, Foster, and Putterman 2010; Grossman 2013;
Grossman and Baldasssarri 2012). The existing literature suggests that the leader
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selection process—specifically, allowing group members to participate in the selection of
their leader—affects both the followers’ and the leaders’ behaviors.
Among followers, people prefer elected rather than appointed leaders (Van Vugt
and De Cremer 1999). Part of the reason is that elected leaders are perceived as more
legitimate (Weber 1978; Walker and Zelditch 1993). Allowing followers to participate in
the leader selection process enhances followers’ perceptions of institutional legitimacy
(Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Dal Bo, Foster, and Putterman 2010), and leaders are
expected to exert their authority—and others are expected to comply—to a greater extent
when leaders are legitimated (Burke, Stets, and Cerven 2007). Thus experimental work
comparing appointed versus elected leadership has consistently shown that followers are
more willing to cooperate with institutions that they themselves have selected—
democratically chosen institutions are associated with greater cooperation rates than
exogenously imposed institutions (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Dal Bo, Foster, and
Putterman 2010; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012).
Aside from followers’ enhanced cooperation with elected leaders, election to the
position may also enhance leaders’ own cooperative behaviors. Lab and field experiments
show that elected leaders feel more responsible and accountable to their followers,
leading to greater cooperative behavior (Grossman 2013). Followers of elected leaders
are less accepting of norm violating behavior by their elected leaders, and elected leaders
anticipate this by behaving more fairly; elected leaders also report feeling more social
responsibility toward their group members (De Cremer and van Dijk 2008). And crossnational studies have shown that elected leaders provide more public goods (Lake and
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Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Stasavage 2005) and are less corrupt (Mauro
1995) than their appointed counterparts.
Of course, election may also result in enhanced cooperation among leaders and
followers because election allows groups to select more effective leaders—i.e., prosocials.
But there is little evidence to support this claim. For instance, Baldassarri and Grossman
(2011) do not find evidence that voters elect leaders who are more effective in terms of
either their own cooperation or in their willingness to use sanctions. Indeed, they find no
difference in appointed vs. elected leaders’ prosociality or use of punishment, although
they still find that people are more cooperative when leaders are elected. Rather, they find
that people are more likely to vote for leaders based on status markers like wealth and
gender—although they also do not find evidence that wealthier and male leaders are more
effective than other types of elected leaders (Baldassari and Grossman 2011; see also
Grossman and Baldassarri 2012). This work suggests that election vs. appointment to
leadership enhances cooperation above and beyond people’s ability to select more
effective leaders when the leader can be selected—specifically, due to the mechanisms
described above, including enhanced feelings of social responsibility in the leader and of
legitimacy in followers.
The main goal of this study is to consider whether public good production is
enhanced before leaders are chosen by the group—that is, whether people compete for
leadership. But I also consider whether, following past work, election to leadership
promotes cooperation once the leader has been installed. Importantly, I compare
cooperation under elected vs. appointed leaders even when leader social value orientation
is held constant across elected vs. appointed leaders. That is, Study 1 has already
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demonstrated that prosocials are more effective leaders than proselfs. But above and
beyond this effect, following the work described above, I expect elections to promote
cooperation after the leader has taken his or her position:
Hypothesis 8: Compared to groups with appointed leaders, groups with elected
leaders will contribute more to the public good.
In sum, in the studies described in the next chapter, I examine whether people prefer
prosocials for leadership (Hypothesis 6, Studies 2a and 2b). I also consider, in Study 2b,
whether leader elections promote public good production via two mechanisms.
Specifically, does holding a group election promote contributions before the leader is
installed (Hypotheses 7a and 7b)? And does it continue to increase cooperative behavior
after (Hypothesis 8) the leader is installed? The next chapter describes the studies I
conducted to test these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDIES 2A AND 2B
In this chapter, I outline, first, the vignette study (Study 2a) and second, the
experiment (Study 2b) designed to test the hypotheses given in the previous chapter.
Specifically, the studies described here allow me to address whether group members who
can choose their leaders will prefer prosocials for the leadership position (Hypothesis 6,
Studies 2a and 2b). Study 2b also allows me to consider whether people compete for
leadership positions by contributing to the public good to a greater extent when their
group members will later be able to elect a leader (Hypotheses 7a and 7b); importantly, I
also address whether or not this competition for leadership prevents people from being
able to effectively identify prosocials when choosing leaders. Finally, Study 2b tests
whether, as shown in some past work, allowing groups to elect their leaders (rather than
randomly appointing them) promotes public good production once the leader is installed
(Hypothesis 8).

Participants and Design, Study 2a
Study 2a was a first step in considering whether people (in this study, third-party
observers to a group producing a public good) select prosocials as leaders. The study was
conducted via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011;
Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014). 50 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) users
located in the United States were asked to imagine that they were a group member
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participating in a decision-making task, as described in more detail below. Participants
were paid $0.50 for completing the survey, which took about ten minutes to complete
(this is a relatively high payment for AMT; see Weinberg et al. 2014). Four respondents
who responded incorrectly to at least one of two basic attention check questions
(described in the next section) were omitted from analyses. The final sample size was 46
participants (56.5% male).

Procedure, Study 2a
Respondents in Study 2a were presented with task instructions nearly identical to
those given in Study 1 (see Appendix C for the full text of the instructions for Study 2a).
Specifically, they read a brief description of the original public good task adapted from
the Study 1 instructions. After reading these basic instructions, they read through several
examples and answered quiz questions to ensure their understanding of the task.
Next, the participants were presented with a table containing the actual round-byround contribution decisions made in the non-punishment rounds for two randomly
selected groups from Study 1. One of these groups had been assigned to the prosocial
leader condition and the other had been assigned to the proself leader condition; the order
in which these two groups were presented to AMT users was counterbalanced.
Specifically, participants in the AMT study viewed a table displaying each of the four
Study 1 participants’ contributions, expressed in dollars, across each of the six rounds.
The instructions on this screen also reminded AMT participants that the group members
could have contributed anywhere from $0 to $20 in each of the six rounds, and asked
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participants to review the contributions decisions and become familiar with them, but
noted that participants did not need to memorize the table (see Appendix C).
Participants then read a new set of instructions that described how the rules would
change for subsequent rounds—i.e., that one group member (the “deductor”) would be
able to make deductions from his or her group members’ earnings. The description of the
rule change, as the description of the original task, was adapted from the instructions
from Study 1. They could then view the contributions table again. Above the table was a
reminder that 1) the table presented group members’ contributions in the task over six
rounds and 2) that the group members did not know that the rules would change until
after they made the decisions given in the table. Below the table they were prompted to
imagine “that you were a member of the group, and that you could select a participant to
the role of Deductor for the next phase of the study.” They were asked to indicate which
of the four group members they would prefer to be appointed to the deductor role.
After selecting their preferred group member, participants were prompted to write
a few sentences explaining their choice. Next, they were asked to select the participant
who contributed the most and the participant who contributed the least over the six
rounds, as basic attention check questions. Respondents could view the contributions
table while they answered these questions. Finally, participants repeated this process once
more (“for a different group”).

Results, Study 2a
Participants in the Mechanical Turk study were not given information about group
members’ social value orientations. Rather, they viewed the group members’ contribution
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decisions in the non-punishment rounds. However, consistent with past work (see Balliet
et al. 2009 for a review), Study 1 participants’ SVO significantly predicted their
contributions in the non-punishment rounds (p < .01), such that prosocials tended to
contribute more than proselfs. Therefore, I considered whether Study 2a participants
tended to select high contributors as leaders, given that, as in much past work (Balliet et
al. 2009), Study 1 high contributors tended to have a prosocial social value orientation.
30 participants (65%) preferred the highest contributor for the leadership position
in one of the scenarios and 28 participants (61%) preferred the highest contributor in the
second scenario. Importantly, both of these highest contributors had been classified as
prosocial. Participants who did not prefer the highest contributor selected one of the other
three participants for the leader position at approximately equal rates. A chi-square
goodness of fit test revealed that the preference for the highest contributor for leadership
was highly significant in both scenarios (χ2 (3) = 41.48, p < .001, Cohen’s w=.95 and χ2
(3) = 33.13, p < .001, Cohen’s w= .85, respectively).
That is, participants tended to select the group member who was most cooperative
to be the leader, in both scenarios. And in both scenarios, the most cooperative group
member had been categorized as prosocial. Indeed, responses to the open-ended question
revealed that participants preferred the highest contributor for leadership because that
participant, for example, “sacrificed the most for the group”, “was the most generous”, or
“contributed the most to the pool over the course of the game…he would be the fairest of
all the players and make fair choices as the deductor”. Thus, Hypothesis 6 was supported:
prosocials generally were preferred for positions of leadership, and if given the
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opportunity to select the leader, Study 1 participants would likely have selected a
prosocial.
Study 2a was a first step in considering whether people prefer prosocials to
leadership. However, it was a vignette study such that third party participants (rather than
contributing group members) were asked to indicate who they would prefer for
leadership, if they were a member of the group. Perhaps more importantly, this study
cannot tell us whether election to leadership—rather than appointment—can enhance
public good production, aside from giving group members the ability to select effective
(prosocial) leaders. Therefore, I conducted a follow-up study to directly compare
appointed to elected leader structures—do elections to leadership promote public good
production, both before and after the election takes place? Study 2b was designed to
address these issues.

Participants and Design, Study 2b
Participants were recruited from large introductory classes at the University of
South Carolina. Each session was conducted in a group of four and each group was
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: elected leader or appointed leader. 65
groups (260 participants; 69% female) completed the study in exchange for payment.
All groups first completed a standard repeated version of a public good dilemma
with no punishment ability. Then, one group member was either elected (elected leader
condition) or randomly assigned (appointed leader condition) to be group leader in the
punishment phase. As in Study 1, the group leader was given the sole ability to deduct
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from the others’ earnings following each round of the punishment phase of the public
good dilemma.

Procedure, Study 2b
Upon their arrival to the lab, participants were escorted to a private room where
they were unable to see or communicate with other group members. Participants
completed a consent form before beginning the computerized task, programmed using zTree version 3.3.11 (Fischbacher 2007). The task began with a series of pre-study
questions, including the same social value orientation (SVO) measure used in Study 1
(Van Lange et al. 1997; see also Appendix A). As in Study 1, I used scores on the SVO
scale to assign the leader in the appointed leader condition, as described below. At no
point during the study were participants told that their responses on the SVO scale would
be used (in the appointed leader condition) to determine who would occupy the leader
role.
After everyone completed the pre-study questionnaire, the computer advanced to
instructions for a public good dilemma without punishment. The description of the task
was similar to those used in Study 1—instructions began by assuring participants of their
anonymity. Then, participants were told that the study consisted of several parts. Part 1
would consist of a series of choices in an “investment decision task”; participants were
told that their and their group members’ decisions in the task would affect their earnings
in the study. As in Study 1, participants read the description of the public good
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(“investment decision”) task, read through several examples, answered several quiz
questions, and then completed two practice rounds7 to ensure their comprehension.
After participants completed the instructions for Part 1, they were told that, to
save time, they would now learn about Part 2 of the study before beginning the actual
task (see Appendix D for the full text of the instructions for Study 2b). Specifically,

In Part 2, you will continue to decide how many points, from 0 to 20, you wish to
contribute to the group fund, and how many to keep for yourself. However, in
Part 2, one group "leader" will have the opportunity to deduct points from their
fellow group members' earnings following each round.

Unlike in Study 1, participants in Study 2b learned about the punishment phase before
beginning the non-punishment phase so that competing for leadership (in the election
condition) was possible. That is, participants in Study 2b were aware that later a leader
would be selected or elected (depending on condition), and they thus had the opportunity
to (potentially) alter their contribution patterns in the first phase as a result of this
knowledge. Aside from the changes to the order in which participants were given the
instructions, the instructions were similar to the punishment phase instructions for Study
1: leaders could spend anywhere from 0 to 10 of their own points to deduct anywhere
from 0 to 30 points from each other group member.

7

For the practice rounds, participants were (correctly) told that the other group members’ choices were

simulated by the computer, and that earnings in the practice rounds would not be counted toward their
earnings during the actual study.
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Next—prior to beginning the non-punishment phase—the instructions described
how the leader for Part 2 would be selected. This was the only portion of the instructions
that differed by condition, either appointed or elected [instructions for elected leader
condition in brackets]:

The leader for Part 2 will be randomly selected by the computer [elected by the
group] at the end of Part 1.

[Specifically, after Part 1, you (and each of the others) will see each group
members' participant numbers and their total contributions to the group fund in
Part 1. Each group member will then be able to vote for one person to be the
leader (you cannot vote for yourself). The winner of the vote will receive the
leader role.]

Finally, after the leader is randomly selected [elected], participant numbers will
change. Therefore, [although your behavior in Part 1 may determine whether you
are elected to be the leader for Part 2,] at the beginning of Part 2 no one
(including the leader) will be able to identify you based on your behavior in Part
1.8
8

In order to consider whether people compete for leadership by engaging in more cooperative behavior

prior to an election, participants knew in advance that a punishment phase would come after the nonpunishment rounds of the study. But this could also result in participants contributing at high rates in the
non-punishment phase because they anticipate that, once the punishment phase begins, leaders will punish
them for non-cooperative behavior in the previous (non-punishment) phase. More importantly, is it possible
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As they did for Part 1, participants answered quiz questions and completed a practice
round. Finally, participants read a brief review of the entire study: they reviewed the
instructions for Part 1, the leader selection process (depending on condition, either
appointed or elected), and Part 2, before beginning Part 1 (the non-punishment phase) of
the study.
Once everyone was ready to begin, as in Study 1, each participant entered a whole
number from zero to twenty to indicate how much they wished to contribute to the group
fund. After all participants had answered, everyone was able to see their own contribution
and earnings, as well as the contributions and earnings of each other group member. Once
everyone finished reviewing the results, participants proceeded to the next round, where
they again decided how much of a new twenty-point endowment to contribute to the
group. This process was repeated for a total of nine rounds. Participants were not told in
advance how many rounds they would complete.
Once the ninth round was completed, participants in the election condition were
reminded that they would now vote for a leader for Part 2 (the punishment phase).
Specifically, they were presented with a table giving each participant’s total contributions
to the group fund across all rounds of the non-punishment phase. Participants could select
that this expectation could differ by condition such that elected leaders (vs. appointed leaders) are
perceived as more (or less) likely to punish others for their past behaviors. This could lead to differences
between conditions in the non-punishment phase due not to competition for election, but to differences in
expectations of being punished in the upcoming punishment phase of the study. I told participants that
participant identifiers would change from the non-punishment phase to the punishment phase to eliminate
this alternative explanation for increased contributions in the election condition.
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one group member for whom they wished to vote. Participants could not vote for
themselves, nor could they see who voted for whom. The computer program selected the
leader based on the group member who had received the most votes. In case of a tie, the
elected leader was selected at random from among the group members who had received
the most votes.
Groups in the appointed leader condition were yoked to groups in the elected
leader condition, such that there was the same number of groups with prosocial (and
proself) leaders in both the elected and appointed leader conditions. Given the Study 1
result that (appointed) prosocials are more effective leaders than proselfs, this ensures
that differences between these two conditions can be attributed to the election process,
rather than to differences in leader SVO across conditions. In the appointed leader
condition, the computer either chose a group member who could be categorized as
prosocial, proself, or unclassified to be the leader, depending on the social value
orientation of the elected leader in a previous group from the election condition. Ties
were broken by selecting at random from among the group members who fell into the
assigned social value orientation category. In both conditions, once the leader was
successfully elected or appointed, participants were shown one final screen where they
were told whether they had received the leader position or not.
The rounds with punishment began similarly to the rounds without punishment.
All group members made simultaneous contribution decisions and then viewed the
results, including each group member’s contribution and earnings. Then, non-leaders in
the leader conditions were told to wait while the leader made his or her deduction
decisions. Those who were leaders were again shown each other group member’s
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contribution and earnings. Below that information, they indicated whether (and if so, how
much) they wished to deduct from each person’s earnings. All group members could
view their and others’ outcomes after deductions—including how many deductions they
had received and their final earnings for the round. This process was repeated for nine
rounds. As in the no-punishment phase of the study, participants were not told the
number of rounds in advance.
Once the public good task was completed, participants were paid based on their
earnings across the eighteen rounds of the study (ranging from $10 to $15) and debriefed.
Each session lasted approximately forty-five minutes.

Results, Study 2b
As in Study 1, I used the nine-item social value orientation scale, completed at the
beginning of the study, to categorize participants’ social value orientation. Following past
work, I combined individualists and competitors into one “proself” category (Simpson
and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 1997). As is standard in the social value orientation
literature (Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 1997), a participant was classified
as a given social value type when he or she answered at least six of the nine items
consistently.
Five groups were omitted from analysis because they contained one or more
participants who either reported confusion about the instructions (one group in the
appointed leader condition), missed all five of the quiz questions designed to check
understanding of the task instructions (three groups, one in the elected leader condition
and two in the appointed leader condition), or a computer problem during the study
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prevented them from completing both the non-punishment phase and the remainder of the
study (one group in the appointed leader condition). After omitting these groups, analyses
were performed on the remaining 60 groups (30 groups each in the appointed and elected
leader conditions). Of the 240 participants included in the study, 124 (52%) were
classified as prosocial, 84 (35%) as proself, and 32 (13%) could not be classified. As in
Study 1, all data were analyzed using multilevel modelling to account for the nested
structure of the data.

Contributions, Non-punishment Rounds
Do people compete for leadership positions? In the non-punishment rounds,
participants were aware that later (depending on condition) they would vote for a leader
or a leader would be randomly assigned. Any significant differences between conditions
in contributions in the non-punishment round, then, would be due to this knowledge of
the upcoming leader selection process. If people contribute more when they anticipate
election to leadership more than when they anticipate appointment to leadership, it would
suggest that people compete for leadership positions.
Results suggest that people do compete for leadership, starting in the very first
round. In a model considering behavior in Round 1, there was a main effect of condition:
those who were told that they would later elect a leader contributed more than those who
were told that a leader would later be randomly assigned (p = .02) (see non-punishment
rounds, Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1, Model 1). This finding is notably different from that of
Study 1, where participants contributed similarly in Round 1 of both the non-punishment
and punishment phase of the study—differences between conditions took time to emerge
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as the leader responded to his or her ability to punish. In Study 2, participants
immediately responded to the knowledge that a leader would later be elected (vs.
randomly assigned)—and they did so by contributing more.

Figure 6.1: Group-Level Contributions in Non-Punishment and Punishment
Rounds, by Condition
14
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10
8

Elected leader
condition
Appointed
leader condition

6
4
2
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Non-Punishment Rounds

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Punishment Rounds

Table 6.1: Contributions to the Public Good, Non-Punishment Rounds

Intercept

Model 1: Round 1
B (SE)
9.68 (.51)***

Model 2: Rounds 2-9
B (SE)
8.40 (.67)***

Elected leader condition

1.76 (.73)*

2.00 (.94)*
-.18 (.07)*

Round
Nparticipants (groups) = 240 (60)
Note: + p < .10

* p < .05

** p < .01
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Nrounds (groups) = 1920 (60)

*** p < .001

The pattern of higher contributions in the election condition held for subsequent
rounds as well: in Rounds 2 through 9, the main effect of condition remained significant
(p = .04); those in the election condition were more cooperative—even though the
election had not yet taken place. As is typical in public good dilemmas without
punishment (Ostrom 2000; Sell and Wilson 1991), there was a main effect of round (p<
.05): contributions declined across the nine rounds. The condition x round interaction was
not significant (p> .7), suggesting that contributions fell across the nine rounds to a
similar extent in both conditions.
These findings demonstrate that participants do compete for leadership positions,
which results in larger public good production than when competition for leadership is
not possible. However, results also show that competition for leadership alone does not
solve the main problem posed by public good dilemmas: that contributions decline over
time. (e.g. Ostrom 2000; Sell and Wilson 1991). Rather, contributions declined over time
to a similar extent in both conditions.
Although the knowledge that a leader would later be elected did not prevent
contributions from falling, did it prevent group members from being able to identify
prosocials for leadership? I also considered whether the increased contribution among
those in the election condition occurred particularly among proselfs (Hypothesis 7b)
versus among all group members (Hypothesis 7a) by adding terms into the models given
above for participants’ social value orientation. That is, were proselfs in particular more
likely to compete for leadership?
In both models, as in Study 1 and much past work (see Balliet et al. 2009 for a
review), social values emerged as a significant predictor of contributions: prosocials
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contributed more than proselfs (p < .001) and unclassified participants (p < .01). Proselfs
and unclassified participants did not differ from each other in their public good
contributions (p = .35). After controlling for social values, the main effect of condition
remained a significant predictor of contributions in round 1 and in rounds 2-9 (p < .01
and p = .02, respectively). But social value orientation did not interact with condition to
predict contributions in the non-punishment phase (ps > .15). This suggests that people
competed for leadership by contributing more when they anticipated an election, but to a
similar extent, regardless of their social value orientation. Hypothesis 7a, then, was
supported while Hypothesis 7b was not. People do compete for leadership, and they do so
to a similar extent regardless of their social values. The result, however, is that people can
still identify prosocials and elect them to leadership positions.

Who Was Elected to Leadership?
As in Study 2a, participants did not know the social value orientation of their
fellow group members when choosing leaders. However, they did know how much each
other group member had contributed in the non-punishment phase of the study. And they
tended to vote for the highest contributor of the three others for whom they could vote
(participants could not vote for themselves). 59% of votes cast were for the highest
contributing group member among the three other group members from which each
participant could choose. The remaining 41% of votes cast were split about equally
between the lowest and middle contributor. These patterns are similar to those observed
in Study 2a, as described above, and lend additional support to Hypothesis 6.
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The result was that 27% of votes cast were for proselfs, while 62% of votes cast
were for prosocials and the remainder were cast for unclassified participants. Ultimately,
a majority (67%) of elected leaders in the study were categorized as prosocial—of the 30
elected leaders, 20 were prosocial. (Given that groups in the appointed leader condition
were yoked to groups in the elected leader condition, the distribution of leader SVOs in
the appointed condition was identical to that in the elected leader groups.) A chi-square
test revealed that prosocial SVO was associated with leadership status in the election
condition, such that prosocials were overrepresented as leaders while proselfs and
unclassified participants were more often followers, χ2(1)= 5.38, p = .02.9
The results thus far suggest that participants engaged in more group-sacrificial
behaviors when they knew that a leader would later be elected (vs. appointed). Further,
within groups, those group members who engaged in more group-beneficial behaviors
received more votes and, ultimately, were more likely to receive the leadership position.
Although people compete for the leadership position, this does not appear to prevent
participants from ultimately selecting the more other-regarding group members among

9

Of course, aside from a disproportionate preference for prosocial leadership, another factor that will

determine whether prosocials receive leadership positions is simply how many prosocials are present in the
group. Indeed, of the 10 groups that did not elect a prosocial leader, three contained no prosocial within the
group to elect. Unlike Study 1, where leader SVO was determined by condition (and thus, was balanced
across conditions), in this study whether the leader is prosocial or proself was partially determined by the
SVO makeup of the group. However, results still suggest that prosocials are disproportionately preferred
for leadership: of the 11 election condition groups that had exactly two prosocials and two proselfs, 8
groups (73%) selected a prosocial for leadership—significantly greater than the 50% of groups that would
be expected by chance, χ2(1) = 9.09, p < .01.
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them to lead. Rather, competition for leadership appears to be one mechanism by which
election, vs. appointment, of leaders can benefit the group—by promoting more otherregarding behavior ahead of the election, resulting in larger public goods. In the next
section, I consider how elections can further enhance public good production—what
happens after the elected (or appointed) leader is installed?

Contributions, Punishment Rounds
Although competition for leadership enhanced public good production during the
non-punishment rounds, as described earlier, it did not keep contributions high over time.
How did the introduction of punishment impact contributions? As in the non-punishment
phase of the study, and importantly, controlling for their (higher) contributions in the
non-punishment rounds, the contributions of members in groups with elected leaders
were significantly higher in the punishment phase, compared to groups with exogenously
appointed leaders (p= .03, see punishment rounds, Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2, Model 1).
This finding supports Hypothesis 8 and replicates some prior work suggesting that groups
who elect their leaders produce larger public goods than groups whose leaders inherit or
are appointed to the role (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri
2012). Importantly, the difference between elected and appointed leadership structures
held even though the leader type (prosocial or proself) was held constant across the two
conditions. This allows me to rule out that elected leadership results in enhanced public
good production simply because elections allow people to select those leaders that Study
1 suggests will be more effective—prosocials.
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Table 6.2: Contributions to the Public Good, Punishment Rounds

Intercept

Model 1: Rounds 1-9
B (SE)
7.87 (.80)***

Model 2: Rounds 1-9
B (SE)
7.88 (.81)**

Elected leader condition

2.35 (1.10)*

2.28 (1.12)*

Round
Contribution, nonpunishment phase
Is leader
Is leader*Elected leader
condition

-.04 (.07)

-.04 (.07)

.15 (.02)**

.15 (.02)**
.01 (.50)
.30 (.70)

Nrounds (groups) = 2160 (60)
Note: * p< .05

Nrounds (groups) = 2160 (60)

** p< .001

The difference between the elected leader and appointed leader conditions in the
punishment phase was observed even after controlling for the differences in contributions
in the non-punishment rounds—which also predicted contributions in the punishment
rounds (p < .001). A second model containing terms for whether the group member was
the leader or not (Table 6.2, Model 2) revealed that leadership status did not impact
contributions—there was no difference between leaders and non-leaders in their
contributions to the group (p= .98), nor was there an interaction between leader status and
condition (p= .67). Rather, results suggest that all members of groups who democratically
elect their leaders—both leaders and followers alike—contribute at higher rates than
those leaders and followers of groups where leaders are appointed exogenously.
Finally, unlike in the non-punishment phase, where contributions declined over
time, there was no effect of round. Rather, the introduction of punishment was associated
with steadily high contributions over time (p = .86). Further, round did not interact with
condition, suggesting that the introduction of either an appointed or an elected leader was
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sufficient to keep contributions high across the punishment rounds (p = .42). However,
group members’ contribution decisions, across all rounds, were significantly higher when
the leader was elected (see punishment rounds, Figure 6.1). Taken as a whole, the results
suggest groups who elect their leaders produce larger public goods—both before and
after the leader is selected.

Punishment Use
Explanations for why elected leaders are more effective than appointed leaders
typically focus on perceptions of enhanced perceptions of institutional legitimacy when
the leader is elected (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011). However, I also consider whether
there are differences between elected and appointed leaders in how they wield their
punishment power. Can increased contributions under elected leaders be explained by
differences in their use of punishment?
Results revealed, first, that leaders tended to direct punishment toward those
group members who contributed less to the public good (p < .001). This was the case for
both elected and appointed leaders, i.e., there was no condition x group member
contribution interaction. After controlling for group members’ contributions, results
revealed that leaders in the election condition punished slightly, but not significantly,
more than their appointed counterparts (p = .14). These results demonstrate that
differences between elected leader and appointed leader groups was not driven by any
differences in the use of punishment.
Turning to differences in punishment based on leader social value orientation,
recall that Study 1 demonstrated that prosocial leaders and proself leaders did not differ
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in the frequency with which they directed punishment at their fellow group members.
These results held for Study 2b: prosocial leaders tended to punish somewhat more than
proselfs, but the difference was not significant (p = .07). This effect did not differ by
condition (i.e., there was no prosocial leader x election interaction, p = .27).

Discussion
Leaders of real-world groups are often selected by their members (Baldassarri and
Grossman 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri 2012). Thus it is important to know whether
real-world groups tend to select their more other-regarding members to lead them. If
groups are unable—or unwilling—to select prosocials for leadership, then the results
from Study 1 suggest that leadership will be detrimental to groups’ public good
production. In that case, the leader “solution” will not be a solution at all.
In Study 2a, third party participants could view the behavior of group members
facing a collective action problem and select from among those group members whom
they would prefer for leadership. Results suggested that these participants preferred those
group members who engaged in more other-regarding behaviors; if given the chance to
elect a leader, they would have overwhelmingly selected prosocials. Study 2b allowed
internal group members to select a leader from among those in the group. Again,
participants showed a marked preference for prosocials to receive the position.
Study 2b also suggested that, supporting past work, groups with elected leaders
contribute more to the public good after the leader is installed. Both leaders and their
followers contributed more when the leader had been elected (vs. appointed). I matched
leader type across conditions, so the observed difference between elected and appointed
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leaders cannot be attributed to participants in the election condition being able to select
more effective leaders. Past work has attributed this difference to enhanced feelings of
social responsibility among leaders and enhanced feelings of legitimacy among
followers. The results from Study 2b support this, but did not directly test these
mechanisms. I return to this issue in the final chapter.
Perhaps more importantly, Study 2b also suggests that allowing group members to
elect their leaders enhances public good production even before the leader is installed.
That is, the results demonstrated that people do compete for leadership, contributing more
to the public good when they are told a leader will later be elected than when they are
told a leader will later be randomly assigned. Importantly, this competition for leadership
does not prevent people from being able to elect prosocials. Because both prosocials and
proselfs increase their contributions when leaders will be elected, groups are still
successfully able to identify prosocials and install them in leadership positions.
Given that prosocial leaders in particular enhance public good production, determining
whether (and how) real-world groups tend to select group-beneficial, i.e., prosocial,
leaders, will be key for determining whether leadership will ultimately help or harm
groups. Studies 2a and 2b were designed to address whether groups select their otherregarding group members to lead them. In addition, Study 2b has demonstrated that
allowing groups to select their leaders can enhance public good production both before
and after elections. In the final chapter, I summarize the results of both studies, and
consider their implications. Finally, I suggest new directions for future research on
leadership and collective action.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Here I have argued that group leadership can be an effective solution to collective
action problem—given that the leader is prosocial. According to the logic outlined in
previous chapters, I have suggested that appointing a single group member to leadership
would impact both leader behaviors and group outcomes via power and influence
processes. Specifically, following Chen et al. (2001), I argued that the acquisition of
power would magnify baseline tendencies such that proself individuals become even
more self-oriented (and thus, contribute even less), while prosocials become more grouporiented (and thus, contribute more), upon obtaining a leadership position.
More importantly, I expected that leaders’ contribution behaviors would shape
group-level contribution norms—and ultimately, group outcomes—via an influence
effect. I also considered whether prosocial and proself leaders would produce different
group-level outcomes via differences in their exercise of punishment (second-order
power effect). Although prosocial and proself leaders punished at similar levels, proselfs
tended to engage in hypocritical punishment, punishing those who contributed as much or
more than they themselves had.
In sum, I have shown that leadership structures can sustain cooperation in
collective action groups. But the benefits of leadership accrued mainly to groups with
prosocial leaders: these groups both contributed more to the public good over time, and
earned more, than groups with proself leaders or with the standard peer sanctioning
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system. Importantly, I demonstrate that groups do prefer prosocials for leadership, and if
given the ability to elect a group leader, they typically select their more other-regarding
group members to lead.
In addition, allowing groups to choose their leaders enhances public good
production above and beyond their ability, and propensity, to choose their more otherregarding group members for the position. Holding an election for group leadership
promotes contributions to the public good not only after the leader is installed, but also
before the leader is chosen—those who know a leader will later be elected contribute
more than those who know a leader will later be randomly assigned. Thus competition for
the leadership position also enhances cooperative behavior. Groups that hold democratic
elections for leadership may induce more cooperative behavior in their members even
before leadership hierarchies emerge. Past research has thus far overlooked this
additional mechanism by which groups may produce larger public goods. Further, I also
find that, as in past work, once the leader is installed groups with elected leaders
contribute at higher rates.
These arguments and findings have a number of important implications for
understanding collective action. As noted earlier, previous work has suggested that while
standard peer sanctioning systems can increase cooperative behavior, they have important
drawbacks. I found that a prosocial leader given sole sanctioning ability increases
contributions significantly more than the standard solution while avoiding those
problems. For instance, while peer sanctioning systems can result in over-punishment,
results from my experiment show that leadership structures greatly reduce that risk.
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Just as importantly, while groups with prosocial leaders fared substantially better
than all other groups, even groups led by proselfs came to earn more than those with peer
sanctioning systems in place. This is a remarkable finding given that peer sanctioning is
the most prominent solution to collective action problems in behavioral economics (for a
review, see Fehr and Gintis 2007). That members of peer sanctioning groups contributed
no more—and earned less—than groups led by proselfs (who decreased their
contributions upon becoming leaders and sanctioned fellow group members
hypocritically) suggests that we should rethink the status of peer sanctioning as a favored
solution to collective action problems.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Although the arguments and findings here advance an understanding of when and
why leadership promotes collective action, like any study, the studies presented here
leave open questions that should be addressed in future research. For instance, in both
studies I considered a limited conception of power, rooted in the ability of leaders to
punish rank and file group members. But this is only one way leaders can exercise power
and future research might consider others, e.g., leaders who can also administer (or
withhold) rewards.
Study 1 reported above is a first investigation into the dynamics and relative
effectiveness of two very different solutions to collective action problems: the standard
solution, which distributes the power to punish equally among peers, and a system that
centralizes punishment in the hands of a single leader internal to the group. Study 2
considered whether leadership systems were more effective when leaders were elected
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rather than appointed, given that elected leaders can typically compete for election.
Therefore, as a first step, Study 1 treated peer punishment and leadership as mutually
exclusive systems, and Study 2 considered only leadership systems.
But real world groups are often characterized by combinations of formal or “top
down” sanctions and informal norms among peers, systems that can work together or in
opposition (Homans 1961; Kitts 2006; Nee and Ingram 1998; Shibutani 1978). An
important next step would be to extend the work here to address the joint effects of these
two systems. For instance, it seems likely that the greater personal sacrifice of prosocial
leaders and the tendency for them to punish rank and file members who contributed
substantially less than they themselves had would have led to the emergence of informal
norms among rank and file members that complement the “formal” sanctions
administered by the leader. On the other hand, the tendency for proself leaders to
hypocritically punish rank and file members who contributed more than the leader
himself had contributed would be more apt to generate oppositional norms, characterized
by disapproval or punishment of peers who contributed “too much” to the collective
good. Likewise, group members who elected their leaders may be more likely to develop
norms for how the leader is expected to behave, perhaps to a greater extent than leaders
who were appointed. This is an important question for future research.
Relatedly, in the groups investigated here, leaders faced no risk of being
sanctioned. Nor did they risk being removed from the leadership position once they had
obtained it, regardless of their contribution or punishment behaviors. But rank and file
members of real world groups may direct sanctions not only at each other but also at
leaders. For instance, group members often can – and sometimes do – act together to oust
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ineffectual leaders. The potential for loss of leadership positions, or the prospect that
informal norms can emerge in opposition to a leader’s goals, may moderate the effects of
power, encouraging more effective and group-oriented leadership even from proselfs.
How such factors alter the dynamics of leadership and collective action could be
addressed in straightforward extensions of the theory and experiment presented above.
Study 2a and 2b suggest that group members tend to select prosocials to lead
them. Importantly, however, participants in Study 2a had direct evidence of group
members’ prosociality. That is, it was relatively straightforward for them to distinguish
who was prosocial (those who were sacrificing for the group) and select on that basis.
Indeed, even in Study 2b, competition for leadership did not prevent participants from
being able to identify and select their more prosocial group members to leadership. But
such direct evidence of group members’ prosociality is not always available. And,
whether evidence of others’ prosociality is available or not, leaders of real-world groups
might be selected based on other qualities which may—or may not—be related to
prosociality, including willingness to punish low contributors (Van Vugt and De Cremer
1999), informal status (Willer 2009), social capital (Glowacki and von Rueden 2011),
greater access to resources (Przepiorka and Diekmann 2013), or gender (Van Vugt and
Spisak 2008). It is therefore possible that self-regarding types will at least sometimes end
up as leaders. More work must consider how people select their leaders under situations
where a variety of information about potential leaders—including some “noise” that may
or may not be related to prosociality—is available.
Further, more work must consider, if proselfs are chosen for leadership, what
mechanisms may encourage them to act in group-serving ways. A variety of factors
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might encourage proself leaders to act in ways that enhance group goals (or, for that
matter, lead prosocial leaders to behave more self-interestedly). Indeed, in real-world
groups, a mix of prosocial and proself motives may be operative, such that both types of
leaders would behave more similarly than they did in Study 1. For instance, prior work
finds that proselfs are nearly as cooperative as prosocials when cooperation results in
reputational benefits (Simpson and Willer 2008). Future work should consider how
proselfs’ greater reputational concerns and, as discussed above, the prospect of losing
leadership positions, might attenuate the person x situation effects observed above.

Conclusion
I have asked whether a leader, given sole responsibility for monitoring and
sanctioning others, can maintain cooperation in groups facing collective action problems.
On the one hand, leaders prevent some of the key problems associated with peer
sanctions, such as over-punishment and earnings losses. Yet some research on power
suggests that the enhanced power that comes along with leadership positions might lead
to self-serving actions, rather than group-oriented behavior. From this perspective, it
might seem puzzling that leadership is so ubiquitous in real-world collective action
groups.
But I proposed and found evidence for a person x situation approach to leadership
that helps shed light on this puzzle. Social value orientation moderates the impact of
leadership on both leaders’ behaviors and group-level outcomes. Other-regarding
(prosocial) leaders contribute more to the group after ascending to leadership, while selfregarding (proself) leaders decrease their contributions even further. Further, I found that
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leaders’ behaviors have large downstream effects on contributions from the rank and file.
As a result, prosocial-led groups as a whole were substantially more productive than
proself-led groups, pointing to the importance of putting power and influence in the right
hands.
Given that prosocials are more effective leaders than proselfs—and lead their
groups to produce larger public goods—do people actually tend to select prosocials to
lead them? If groups are unable or unwilling to select prosocials for leadership, then the
leader “solution” may not be a solution at all. However, I found that if people are given
the choice to select a group leader, they typically prefer their more other-regarding group
members. In addition, selecting leaders via an election process, rather than appointment,
enhances public good production both before and after the elected leader is installed.
That is, these results suggest that allowing group members to choose their leaders will
result in an efficient and effective sanctioning system.
Finally, I also found that prosocial leaders were more effective in maintaining
contributions than the standard peer sanctioning system, where the power to punish
others is distributed equally among all group members. More surprisingly, although
proself leaders decreased their contributions substantially after receiving leadership, and
influenced the rank and file to contribute less as well, peer sanctioning groups did not
outperform them in public good production. In fact, after accounting for the detrimental
costs of punishments, peer sanctioning groups fared worse than groups with selfregarding leaders. These results cast doubt on the viability of standard solutions that rely
on peer sanctions, suggesting instead that leadership structures promise more effective
solutions to collective action problems.
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APPENDIX A: SVO MEASURE, STUDY 1 AND STUDY 2B
In order to classify participants’ social value orientations (SVOs) in Studies 1 and
2b, and to assign leaders in Study 1, I used the most common measure of SVO—the nineitem triple dominance measure (Van Lange, Otten, DeBruin, and Joireman 1997).
Participants in Study 1 and 2b completed this measure, reproduced below (see also Van
Lange et al. 1997), before beginning the public good task instructions:

In this set of questions, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly
paired with another person, whom we will refer to simply as the “other.” Other is
someone you do not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future.
Both you and Other will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C.
Your own choices will produce points for yourself and Other. Likewise, Other’s
choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point has value: The
more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points Other receives,
the better for him/her.

Here’s an example of how this task works.
You Get
Other Gets

A
500
100

B
500
500
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C
550
300

In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and Other would
receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and Other 500;
and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and Other 300. So, you see that
your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the number of
points the other receives.

Before you begin making choices, keep in mind that there are no right or wrong
answers – choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also,
remember that the points have value: The more of them you accumulate, the
better for you. Likewise, from the Other’s point of view, the more points s/he
accumulates, the better for him/her.

For each of the three choice situations below, choose A, B or C, depending on
which column you prefer most.
1
You Get
Other Gets

A
480
80

B
540
280

C
480
480

You Get
Other Gets

A
560
300

B
500
500

C
500
100

You Get
Other Gets

A
520
520

B
520
120

C
580
320

You Get

A
500

B
560

C
490

2

3

4
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Other Gets

100

300

490

You Get
Other Gets

A
560
300

B
500
500

C
490
90

You Get
Other Gets

A
500
500

B
500
100

C
570
300

You Get
Other Gets

A
510
510

B
560
300

C
520
110

You Get
Other Gets

A
550
300

B
500
100

C
500
500

You Get
Other Gets

A
480
100

B
490
490

C
540
300

5

6

7

8

9

As is standard in the social value orientation literature (Simpson and Willer 2008;
Van Lange et al. 1997), a participant was classified as a given social value type
(prosocial, individualistic, or competitive) when he or she answered at least six of
nine items consistently and were “unclassified” if not. Prosocial choices are: 1c
2b 3a 4c 5b 6a 7a 8c 9b; individualistic choices are: 1b 2a 3c 4b 5a 6c 7b 8a 9c;
and competitive choices are: 1a 2c 3b 4a 5c 6b 7c 8b 9a (Van Lange et al. 1997).
Following past work, I combined individualists and competitors into one
“proself” category (Simpson and Willer 2008; Van Lange et al. 1997).

112

APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS, STUDY 1
Reproduced here are the materials for Study 1, including 1) the instructions,
examples, and quiz questions for the non-punishment rounds of the public good dilemma
(described to participants as an “investment decision task”) and 2) the instructions,
examples, and quiz questions for the punishment rounds, which participants viewed after
the nine rounds of the non-punishment phase were completed. All study materials were
programmed and presented using z-Tree version 3.3.11 (Fischbacher 2007).

[Instructions, Non-punishment rounds]
In today's study, you will take part in a series of "investment decisions." Your
earnings in today's study will partly depend on how well you understand the
instructions. So, please read all instructions and examples carefully.

The basic directions are as follows: you will be completing this study in a group
of four. Your group members are three other participants currently in the lab. You
will not meet your group members at any time, nor will you learn any identifying
information about your group members. Likewise, your group members will not
learn any identifying information about you.

The study consists of several periods (or rounds). At the start of each round, you
(and each of your other group members) get 20 points. You can contribute
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anywhere from 0 to 20 of these points to a "group fund." Any points you do not
contribute to the group fund remain in your personal fund, for you to keep.

Anything that is contributed to the group fund will be doubled. Then, the doubled
amount will be divided between all four of the members of your group, whether
or not they contributed to the group fund. (Similarly, other group members'
contributions to the group fund will be doubled and redistributed equally among
all members of the group.) Your total earnings per round are your share of the
earnings from the group fund, plus whatever you did not invest. The same goes
for other group members.

Points earned over each round will be translated into dollars at the end of the
study. So, the more points you earn, the more money you will receive.

Make sure you have carefully read and understand the instructions. Next, you will
read over a few examples. If you have any questions about the instructions, you
may slightly open your door and a research assistant will be with you in a
moment.

If you understand the instructions, click "Continue."

[Example screens, Non-punishment rounds]
[Screen 1] Let's go over an example.
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Imagine that each group member invests all 20 of their points. Thus, there are
now 80 points in the group fund (20 points from each of 4 group members).

Since anything in the group fund is doubled, the 80 points become 160 points.
Then, the group fund is divided by four (for each of the four group members). So,
each group member receives 40 points.

Since everyone invested all of their points to the group fund, each player finishes
the period with 40 points (40 earned from the group fund + 0 kept in the personal
fund).

If you have any questions about this example, please slightly open your door and
a research assistant will be with you in a moment.

If you understand the example, click "Continue."

[Screen 2] Here's another example.

Imagine that each group member invests none of their 20 points. Now, there are
zero points in the group fund.
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Since there are no points in the group fund to double, and no points to divide by
all the group members, everyone earns 20 points from this round: 0 points from
the group fund + 20 points kept in the personal fund.

If you have any questions, please slightly open your door and a research assistant
will be with you in a moment.

If you understand the example, click "Continue."

[Screen 3] Imagine that three group members invest all 20 of their points, and one
group member invests none of their points. Thus, there are 60 points in the group
fund (20 points x 3 group members).

The 60 points in the group fund gets doubled to 120 points. Then, the 120 points
gets divided into four so that every group member gets 30 points.

The three group members who invested their points end the round with 30 points
each (30 points from the group fund + 0 points kept in the personal fund). The
group member who invested nothing ends the round with 50 points (30 earned
from the group fund + 20 kept in the personal fund).

If you have any questions, please slightly open your door and a research assistant
will be with you in a moment.
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If you understand the example, click "Continue."

[Next participants completed several open-ended quiz questions. Each question
was displayed on a separate screen; the first two paragraphs of the material
below were presented before each question. After answering a given question,
participants were informed whether or not their answer was correct. Incorrect
answers were followed by a detailed explanation of the correct answer. Correct
answers in bold]

Next, to make sure you understand everything, you'll complete a few practice
questions.

Imagine that your three group members each contribute 8 of their 20 points to the
group fund. You contribute 0 points to the group fund. Please answer the
following question about this scenario:

What is the total number of points in the group fund (BEFORE it is doubled)?
24

What is the total number of points in the group fund (AFTER it is doubled)?
48

117

How much does each group member receive from the GROUP fund (that is, after
the amount in the group fund is divided amongst each of the four group
members)?
12

How many points do your fellow group members each receive TOTAL for this
round (that is, the amount earned from the group fund plus any kept in their
private fund)?
24

How many points do YOU receive TOTAL for this round (that is, the amount
earned from the group fund plus any kept in your private fund)?
32

[Instructions, peer punishment condition, punishment rounds; Instructions for the
leader conditions in brackets]
For the next part of the study, you will continue to make investment decisions.
However, some of the rules will change. Therefore, please carefully read the
instructions so that you understand how the rules will change.

Under the new rules, every group member [one group member (chosen at
random)] will have the opportunity to deduct points from their fellow group
members following each round.
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Specifically, after each round (that is, after all members' contributions for that
round are known), everyone [one person] will be able to deduct points from their
group members' earnings, if they choose to do so. It costs 1 point to deduct 3
points from another group member. For example, if a [the] group member chooses
to spend two of his/her points to deduct points from Participant X, Participant X's
earnings will be reduced by six points.

Group members can spend anywhere from 0 to 10 of their own points to deduct
points from each of their group members. That is, they may choose not to deduct
from a group member's earnings. Or, they may choose to spend some of their own
points (up to 10) to deduct points (up to 30) from another group member.

[A few other things: on a later screen, we will let you and your group members
know who has been randomly assigned to the role described above. Whoever is
randomly selected will continue in this role for the remainder of the study.]

Please make sure that you have read the instructions carefully and understand the
new rules. If you have any questions, please slightly open your door and a
research assistant will be with you in a moment. Otherwise, click "Continue."

[Quiz questions, peer punishment condition, changes for the leader conditions in
brackets, correct answer in bold]
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Next, you'll complete a few practice questions.

[Imagine you have been randomly assigned to make deductions.] Imagine that
you choose to spend 9, 5, and 0 points to deduct from your three group members'
earnings. What is the total cost to you?
14

[Imagine that you have been randomly assigned to make deductions.] Imagine
that you spent 3 points to deduct from one of your group members' earnings. By
how many points will that group member's earnings be reduced?
9

[Imagine that you were not randomly assigned to make deductions.] Imagine that
one of your group members [The person who was assigned to make deductions]
spent 4 points to deduct from your earnings. By how many points will your
earnings be reduced?
12
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APPENDIX C: INSTRUCTIONS, STUDY 2A
Reproduced here are the instructions for Study 2a. These include a description of
the non-punishment rounds of the public good dilemma (described to participants as a
“group decision making task”) and, second, the instructions for the punishment phase of
the study, where a single group member (the “deductor”) could make deductions from the
others’ earnings. The entire study was presented to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk users (see
Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011; Weinberg, Freese, and McElhattan 2014) using
Qualtrics Online Survey Software.

[Instructions, Non-punishment rounds]
Imagine that you were a group member participating in a task called the Group
Decision Making Task. The task consists of six rounds. At the start of each round,
each group member gets 20 dollars. Each can contribute anywhere from 0 to 20
dollars to a "group fund."

Any amount a group member does not contribute to the group fund remains in
his/her “personal fund”, for that group member to keep.

Any money that is contributed to the “group fund” is doubled. Then, the doubled
amount will be divided between all members of the group, whether or not they
contributed to the group fund.
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Each group members’ total earnings per round are their share of the earnings from
the group fund, plus whatever they kept in the personal fund.

Make sure you have carefully read and understand the instructions. Next, we will
go over a few examples, then, you'll answer a few quiz questions to ensure your
understanding of the task.

[Examples, Non-punishment rounds]
Let's go over some examples for a group of four.

Imagine each group member invests all 20 of their dollars. There are now 80
dollars in the group fund ($20 x 4 group members).

Since anything in the group fund is doubled, the $80 becomes $160. Then, the
group fund is divided by four (for each of the four group members). So, each
group member receives $40. Each player finishes the period with $40 ($40 from
the group fund + $0 kept in the personal fund)

Now, imagine that each group member invests none of their money ($0 in the
group fund).
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Since there is nothing in the group fund to double and divide by all the group
members, everyone earns $20: $0 from the group fund + $20 kept in the personal
fund.

Make sure you have carefully read and understand the examples. Later, you'll
answer a few quiz questions to ensure your understanding of the task.

Finally, imagine that three group members invest all 20 of their dollars, and one
group member invests nothing. Thus, there are 60 dollars in the group fund ($20 x
3 group members).

The $60 in the group fund gets doubled to $120. Then, the $120 gets divided by
four so that every group member gets $30.

The three group members who invested their points end the round with $30 each
($30 from the group fund + $0 kept in the personal fund). The group member who
invested nothing ends the round with $50 ($30 from the group fund + $20 kept in
the personal fund).

Make sure you have carefully read and understand the examples before clicking
Continue. Next, you'll answer a few quiz questions to ensure your understanding
of the task.
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[Quiz questions, Non-punishment rounds, correct answers in bold]
Each group member can contribute anywhere from 0 to 50 dollars to the group
fund.
True
False

Money contributed to the group fund is tripled.
True
False

Money in the group fund is divided evenly amongst all group members,
regardless of whether or not they contributed to the group fund.
True
False

[Participants in the Mechanical Turk study were then shown the contributions of
each group member, per round, for one of two randomly selected groups from
Study 1 (the order in which these two groups were displayed was
counterbalanced)]:

Now please imagine that the group members participating in this task contributed
as follows.
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Round:

1

2

3

4

5

6

Participant 1 contributed:

$20

$10

$10

$15

$16

$15

Participant 2 contributed:

$5

$20

$20

$20

$5

$1

Participant 3 contributed:

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

Participant 4 contributed:

$10

$8

$5

$8

$2

$8

Remember, group members can contribute from $0 to $20 per round. Briefly look
over the participants’ contributions, to get acquainted with them. We'll ask you
some questions about the table later, but you don't need to memorize anything.

[Instructions, punishment rounds]:
Now imagine that the group members were told the task would change: after each
round (that is, after all members’ contributions for that round are known), one
group member will have the opportunity to deduct money from his or her fellow
group members’ earnings after each round, if he/she chooses to do so. (We will
call this person the Deductor.)

It costs $1 to deduct $3 from another group member. For example, if the
Deductor chooses to spend $2 to reduce Participant X’s earnings, Participant X’s
earnings will be reduced by $6.
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The Deductor may choose not to deduct from a group member’s earnings. Or, the
Deductor may choose to spend some of his/her own money (up to $10) to deduct
points (up to $30) from another group member.

Whoever is selected to deduct points will continue in this role for several
additional rounds.

Make sure that you have read the instructions carefully and understand the new
rules.

[Finally participants were asked to choose one group member for the Deductor
role:]
Recall that the group members participating in this task contributed as follows
over six rounds. Note that the group members did not know that the rules would
change until after they made the decisions given below.

Round:

1

2

3

4

5

6

Participant 1 contributed:

$20

$10

$10

$15

$16

$15

Participant 2 contributed:

$5

$20

$20

$20

$5

$1

Participant 3 contributed:

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

Participant 4 contributed:

$10

$8

$5

$8

$2

$8
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Imagine that you were a member of the group, and that you could select a
participant to the role of Deductor for the next phase of the study. Which
participant would you choose to be the Deductor?
-Participant 1
-Participant 2
-Participant 3
-Participant 4

[Finally, participants were asked several questions about the Deductor they
chose. The same contribution information presented earlier was also displayed to
participants while they completed these questions]
You chose Participant [Choice] to be the Deductor. Please explain, in a few
sentences, why you chose Participant [Choice] for the Deductor role. [openended]

The participant that I chose to be the Deductor would be a fair Deductor.
-Strongly Agree
-Agree
-Neither Agree nor Disagree
-Disagree
-Strongly Disagree

The participant that I chose to be the Deductor would be a moral Deductor.
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-Strongly Agree
-Agree
-Neither Agree nor Disagree
-Disagree
-Strongly Disagree

The participant that I chose to be the Deductor would be a rational Deductor.
-Strongly Agree
-Agree
-Neither Agree nor Disagree
-Disagree
-Strongly Disagree

I predict that the participant that I chose to be the Deductor would make:
-1 (No deductions at all)
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7 (Many deductions)

128

[Attention check questions. The same contributions information presented earlier
was displayed to participants while they completed these questions:]
Which participant contributed the most (across all six rounds)?
-Participant 1
-Participant 2
-Participant 3
-Participant 4

Which participant contributed the least (across all six rounds)?
-Participant 1
-Participant 2
-Participant 3
-Participant 4

Now we want you to answer some questions about a different group.
[Information for the second group is shown below. Participants completed the
same set of questions given above for the second group.

Round:

1

2

3

4

5

6

Participant 1 contributed:

$10

$10

$10

$10

$11

$12

Participant 2 contributed:

$6

$8

$10

$12

$11

$0

Participant 3 contributed:

$20

$20

$15

$15

$20

$15

Participant 4 contributed:

$0

$4

$3

$7

$0

$4
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APPENDIX D: INSTRUCTIONS, STUDY 2B
Reproduced here are the materials for the punishment rounds (referred to as “Part
2”) of Study 2b. The instructions, examples, and quiz questions for the non-punishment
rounds (“Part 1”) were presented before the material below; see Appendix B for these
materials as they were virtually identical to those used in Study 1. Study 2b was
programmed and presented using z-Tree version 3.3.11 (Fischbacher 2007).

[Instructions, punishment rounds]
Before we begin Part 1, to save time, we will go ahead and tell you what Part 2 of
the study will be like. Again, your earnings today will partly depend on how well
you understand the instructions. So, please read all instructions carefully.

In Part 2, you will continue to decide how many points, from 0 to 20, you wish to
contribute to the group fund, and how many to keep for yourself. However, in
Part 2, one group "leader" will have the opportunity to deduct points from
their fellow group members' earnings following each round.

Specifically, after each round-- that is, after all members' contributions for that
round are known-- the leader will be able to deduct points from their group
members' earnings, if he/she chooses. It costs 1 point to deduct 3 points from
another group member. So, for example, if the leader chooses to spend 2 of
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his/her points to deduct earnings from Participant X, Participant X's earnings will
be reduced by 6 points.

Leaders can spend anywhere from 0 to 10 of their own points to deduct points
from each of their other group members. That is, they may choose not to spend
any points. Or, they may choose to spend up to 10 of their own points, to deduct
up to 30 points, from each of their group members.

No one can deduct points from the leader, and whoever receives the leader
position will have that position for the remainder of the study.

Make sure you have carefully read and understand the instructions for Part 2.
Then, click "Continue".

[Example screens, punishment rounds]
[Screen 1] To explain to you a bit more about the leader role for Part 2, consider
this example.

Imagine you contributed 5 points to the group fund. Further imagine that
Participant X contributed 0 points to the group, Y contributed 5 points, and Z
contributed 10 points. (As a result, you would earn 25 points for that round. X
would earn 30 points, Y earns 25 points, and Z earns 20 points.)
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If you were the leader for Part 2, you could then decide how much to deduct
from each group member. For instance, you could reduce X's earnings by 0
points, 30 points, or anywhere in between, if you chose. You could also reduce Y
and Z's earnings, if you choose. You cannot deduct earnings from yourself, nor
can any other group member make deductions from you, if you are the
leader. You would be able to do this for all of Part 2, which is the last Part of the
study.

[Screen 2] Now imagine instead that Participant Z was the leader for Part 2. Z
could decide how much to deduct from each group member. For instance, he/she
could reduce X's earnings by 0 points, 30 points, or anywhere in between. He/she
could also reduce your earnings, if they chose. Z could not deduct earnings
from him or herself, nor can you, or any other group member, make
deductions from the leader, Z. Z would be the leader for all of Part 2, which is
the last Part of the study.

[Instructions, appointed leader condition, elected leader condition in brackets]
The leader for Part 2 will be randomly selected by the computer [elected by the
group] at the end of Part 1.

[Specifically, after Part 1, you (and each of the others) will see each group
members' participant numbers and their total contributions to the group
fund in Part 1. Each group member will then be able to vote for one person to be
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the leader (you cannot vote for yourself). The winner of the vote will have the
leader role.]

Finally, after the leader is randomly selected [elected], participant numbers will
change. Therefore, [although your behavior in Part 1 may determine whether
you are elected to be the leader for Part 2,] at the beginning of Part 2 no one
(including the leader) will be able to identify you based on your behavior in
Part 1.

Next, you will complete a few quiz questions to ensure your understanding of the
instructions. Click Continue.

[Manipulation check question, correct answer varied by condition]
How will the leader for Part 2 be chosen? The leader will be:
-Elected by the group
-Randomly chosen

[Instructions summary, appointed leader condition, elected leader condition in
brackets]
To sum up the task today, you will first complete a series of Part 1 rounds, where
no one will make deductions.
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The computer will then randomly select [You and the others will then elect] a
group leader for Part 2.

Participant IDs will change [after the leader is elected, but] before Part 2 begins.

Then in Part 2, the leader can deduct points from others.

Click Continue when you are ready to begin.
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